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 1 
1. Introduction 
 
The United Nations role in counter terrorism has grown significantly over the past half 
century. The structure of terrorist groups and the form that their attacks take have become 
increasingly transnational and innovative. This has developed in line with the many 
technological advances and globalization that the world is currently experiencing.  
Counter terrorism initiatives, historically, were considered as purely domestic matters. This 
is however not sustainable in the modern day and an international response is needed. The 
change in terrorist approaches makes the increased United Nations involvement in counter 
terrorism initiatives more important. Its mandate and expertise in the areas of security, 
development and international cooperation allow it to contribute and bring together all 
aspects that are instrumental to the prevention and eradication of international terrorism. 
The United Nations counter terrorism initiatives that will be outlined throughout this 
thesis, provide international guidance on counter terrorism matters and facilitate 
cooperation, whilst not limiting State sovereignty, therefore effectively utilizing many of 
the organisation’s best attributes.  
 
Terrorism as an idea and international legal phenomenon has existed for centuries. The 
first use of the word ‘terreur’ in print is said to have appeared in 1798 during the French 
Revolution.1 Therefore international efforts to eliminate such acts started years before the 
establishment of the United Nations. The extensive history of terrorism and its 
controversial nature means that it has attracted much academic and legal debate.  
There are estimated to be over one hundred drafted definitions of terrorism. Laqueur 
contends that out of these definitions, the only general characteristic agreed upon is that 
terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence.2 Despite the many years of 
consideration and the many different formulations of such a definition, United Nations 
Member States continue to be unable to come up with a singular definition of 
‘international terrorism’.  
                                                
1 Young, R. (2006). Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law 
and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation. Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review , 29, 23. At pg 27. 
2 Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York: 
Oxford University Press. At pg 6.  
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In 1996 the General Assembly through Resolution 51/2103 established an Ad Hoc 
Committee with the mandate to draft additional international instruments on terrorism. The 
Committee have successfully negotiated a number of Conventions, including the 
International Convention against the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 19994 
[hereafter ‘Financing Convention’].  
In 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee moved on, to begin negotiations on a Comprehensive 
Convention against International Terrorism. They have been in session discussing such an 
instrument for 14 years, with little success. This is due mainly to the international 
community’s inability to agree upon a definition of international terrorism. The issues 
raised during the negotiations revolve around three main points relating to the scope of the 
definition. These are the effect of the Right to Self-Determination, State sponsored 
terrorism and the applicability of such a definition to a State’s armed forces. These points 
are raised each year with little or no solution found. Therefore, at present, no 
comprehensive international convention against terrorism exists. 
 
The lack of such a definition and structured comprehensive instrument is seen 
internationally as a dent to the legitimacy of any United Nations counter terrorism policy. 
This can be demonstrated effectively through a statement by the International Peace 
Academy. It notes that: 
 
‘Action in the absence of an agreed-upon definition exposes the United Nations to the 
charge of double standards, thus undermining the very legitimacy and universality that are 
among its most precious assets.’5 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a pragmatic, solution-focused approach to resolving 
these legitimacy issues. It seeks to demonstrate that parallel to the Ad Hoc Committee 
discussions, a separate, internationally accepted, United Nations counter terrorism policy 
has developed made up of a global strategy against terrorism along with a framework of 
international counter terrorism Conventions and Security Council Resolutions. These 
instruments are respected by States and have resulted in the streamlining of domestic 
                                                
3 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 December 1996 
4 United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism,” 9 December 1999, No. 38349  
5 O'Neil, W. (2003). Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations. Conference Report. New 
York: International Peace Academy. At pg 4 
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counter terrorism policies, allowing for effective international cooperation in counter 
terrorism matters, despite no agreement being made within the Ad Hoc Committee. The 
policy has also received much support from a number of technical assistance initiatives. 
These include the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, which has created a legal training curriculum that strengthens the capacity of States 
to implement the policy. 6 
The policy does not however contain an independent definition of international terrorism, 
an element that has the potential to limit its success and legitimacy. This thesis therefore 
seeks to suggest a possible solution to this problem. It aims to highlight that the definition 
of terrorism found within Article 2(1) of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 could be utilised as a general definition of terrorism, to 
fill this void and provide clarity and legitimacy to the United Nations counter terrorism 
policy as a whole. It will contend that this definition is general enough to serve as a general 
definition of terrorism and could be used as a tool, to guide States in the application of the 
international counter terrorism instruments. It also has the potential, if it becomes more 
accepted, to reach customary international law status as an independent universal 
definition of terrorism. 
 
The first Chapter of this thesis will seek to provide the background to this discussion. It 
will examine the development of United Nations counter terrorism policy, starting from the 
organizations inception in 1945. This will provide an overview of its accomplishments and 
failings, whilst also shedding some light upon the development of the powerful political 
considerations that influence the topic.  
The first Chapter will begin, in section one, by providing the main historical analysis, 
examining the work of the United Nations from 1945 to the September 11th attacks in 
2001. This will frame the further discourse, allowing for an understanding of how these 
historical factors influence present day decision-making.  
The discussion will then move on, focusing in detail on the post September 11th counter 
terrorism initiatives developed by the United Nations. It will examine both the Security 
Council and the General Assembly’s contributions. In particular it will focus upon the 
General Assembly’s development of the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and the 
                                                
6 Branch, T. P. (2010). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved 2014 from Counter Terrorism 
Legal Training Curriculum: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Training_Curriculum_Module2/English.pdf 
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associated Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism. This Framework is important for 
this thesis’ discussion. It contains 18 international Conventions, Protocols and 
Amendments on international terrorism, along with 6 Security Council Resolutions. Each 
Convention is based upon a common framework, and then additionally contains a number 
of specialised provisions, covering a different element and aspect of international 
terrorism. Included and embedded in one of these Conventions (the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999), this thesis contends, 
there is a definition of international terrorism. 
These two important General Assembly initiatives, form the most current and 
comprehensive strategies on counter terrorism to exist internationally.  
This first Chapter will therefore provide the foundations for the thesis, highlighting 
relevant elements of the United Nations counter terrorism policy and the factors that 
influence its development and interpretation. 
 
The second Chapter will then move on to examine in more detail the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999.  This Convention is 
one of the 18 instruments found within the Universal Legal Framework Against Terrorism. 
It is also the only United Nations led Convention in force that includes a definition of an 
act of international terrorism. This thesis intends to take this specific definition of 
terrorism, found within Article 2(1) of the Convention, out of the financing context.  
The second Chapter therefore aims to provide the background for the thesis’ main claim by 
examining the definition’s current context and the affects that this may have upon its 
ability to be applied as a general definition of international terrorism. It also seeks to add 
further legitimacy to the definition by praising and critiquing the Convention that it is 
taken from, analysing why this Convention has gained such a high level of international 
acceptance.  
The second Chapter will therefore begin by analysing the Convention’s drafting history 
and the controversies that have arisen during its negotiation process. It will then move on 
to examine the effect, upon the Conventions ratification rate, that September 11th 2001, 
especially Security Council Resolution 1373, has had. The September 11th attacks 
transformed the Convention from an instrument having little international acceptance, to 
one that has the highest number of State parties of all of the universal framework counter 
terrorism conventions. It has also resulted in a number of technical assistance initiatives 
being developed to support its implementation.  
 5 
The second Chapter will then conclude with a brief discussion on a number of the 
Conventions specialised provisions. This will outline in more detail how the definition is 
currently applied and the effect that this unique context could have upon the definitions 
ability to be applied more generally.  
Overall, the second Chapter’s discourse seeks to highlight the strong international support 
for the Financing Convention as a whole and demonstrate why it holds a privileged 
position within United Nations counter terrorism policy. It will therefore attempt to add 
further legitimacy to the definition proposed and highlight whether its current context is 
likely to considerably affect its ability to be applied as a wider more general definition of 
terrorism.  
 
The third and final Chapter of this thesis then moves on to look in detail at the Financing 
Conventions definition of terrorism. It will begin by examining in detail the definition’s 
different objective and subjective elements, evaluating their effectiveness and purpose.  
This Chapter will then move on to compare the definition, with Europe’s regional 
definition of terrorism, found within the European Council’s Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism.7 This definition, although regional, was one of the first definitions 
of terrorism to be drafted post September 11th 2001 and provides an example of a more 
general and comprehensive definition of terrorism, which seeks to streamline European 
Union Member States domestic law. The purpose of such a comparison is to both praise 
and critique the Financing Convention’s definition. It seeks to prove that the many 
similarities between the definitions, especially in regards to their formulation, supports this 
thesis’ claim that the Financing Conventions definition could be applicable in a more 
general context, to terrorist acts outside of the financing context.  
 
The thesis will have therefore overall have demonstrated that the absence of a definition 
within United Nations counter terrorism policy can be resolved pragmatically through the 
use of the Financing Convention’s definition of terrorism, thereby alleviating the 
challenges to the legitimacy of the United Nations counter terrorism action.     
                                                
7 European Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating terrorism OJ L 164, 
22.6.2002, p 1-20 
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2. The United Nation’s role in terrorism prevention 
 
This Chapter will begin the thesis analysis by introducing the United Nations counter 
terrorism policy. It will provide a historical background to the issues, shining some light 
upon the strong political considerations that affect the topic and through this attempt to 
provide some clarity as to why a definition of international terrorism has not been adopted.  
It will highlight in particular, the strength of the General Assembly’s contribution, through 
its negotiations within the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism and its adoption of the Global 
Counter Terrorism Strategy and the Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism. 
2.1 The historic development of the United Nation’s approach to Counter Terrorism 
2.1.1 The League of Nations contribution  
 
The international community have been grappling with the consequences of acts of 
terrorism for centuries, and international efforts to combat such acts started a number of 
years before the establishment of the United Nations. The League of Nations [hereafter 
‘the League’], the United Nations predecessor, was actively engaged in the area. In 1934, 
in Marseilles, a Croatian extremist assassinated the King of Yugoslavia and the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.8 The League was called upon to respond to such acts, 
establishing a Special Committee that aimed to make recommendations on international 
cooperation for the suppression of terrorism.9 The Committee attracted some of Europe’s 
finest international jurists, who discussed the creation of a codified definition of terrorism 
and ways in which to punish acts of political terrorism.10  
The result of these deliberations was the Draft Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism, which was published by the Committee in 1937. The draft 
Convention aimed to encourage the incorporation of the crime of terrorism into domestic 
legislation. It provided a definition, which stated that terrorist acts were, ‘all criminal acts 
directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of 
particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.’11 
                                                
8 Young, R. (2006). Defining Terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law 
and its influence on definition in domestic legislation’ 29 Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review 23 at pg. 6 
9 Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac Books. At 
Pg 8 
10 ibid 
11 19 League of Nations Official Journal 23 (1938) 
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This definition provides little guidance on what criminal acts it intends to cover, which as 
the later discussion will highlight, is the reverse of what is seen today in international 
counter terrorism policy.12   
Despite these efforts, the Convention never came into force, mainly due to the outbreak of 
the Second World War two years later and the demise of the League. It is however, still 
consulted today, as a template, for the creation of a Comprehensive Convention and still 
represents one of the few drafted international definitions of terrorism.13  
2.1.2 The creation of the United Nations and the beginnings of its counter terrorism policy 
 
During the Second World War, discussions began that would lead to the creation of the 
United Nations. The Allied leaders met to devise a plan for a post war era of peace and 
security. The leaders wished to prevent such a war from reoccurring by being forward 
looking, assessing potential threats of the future.  
In 1945 the United Nations was established. The records of the San Francisco Conference 
show no evidence that terrorism or threats from non-State actors were considered by 
drafters to be potential future obstacles to international peace and security. Therefore 
terrorism holds no place within the United Nations Charter. The Charter was however 
drafted broadly enough that such unforeseeable acts could be addressed through 
interpretation.14 
 
One principle, which was a clear outlined priority of the drafters, is the right to Self-
Determination, enshrined within Article 1(2) of the Charter. The article states that one of 
the purposes of the United Nations is to ‘develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and Self-Determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’15  
The United Nations has stayed true to such a priority and since its creation has facilitated 
the independence of more than 80 former colonies comprising some 750 million people.16  
                                                
12 Saul, B. (2011). The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism. Journal of International 
Criminal Justice , 1 (4), 1-19. At pg 16 
13 Ruperez, J. (n.d.). The United Nations Fight Against Terrorism. Retrieved 2014 from 132nd International 
Senior Seminar Visiting Expoert Papers: Resource Material Series No.71: 
www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No71/No71_07VE_Ruperez.pdf 
14 Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac Books.. 
At pg 8 
15 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI art 1(2) 
16 United Nations History. (n.d.). Retrieved 2014 from United Nations: 
https://www.un.org/en/decolonization/ 
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The strong support for this principle has however developed into one of the roots of the 
organization’s reluctance and inability to draft a comprehensive counter terrorism 
convention, along with a supporting definition. The fear being that the creation of such an 
instrument may prevent the ability of peoples to fight against further foreign subjugation 
and achieve Self-Determination. The phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom 
fighter’ is a way of describing this dilemma further.17 This dichotomy can be seen in many 
situations over the past 100 years. For example, organizations such as the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation are viewed by many States as a terrorist organization, but by many 
others as a body fighting for the freedom of the Palestinian people.18  
This interplay between the two concepts continues to burden the development of 
international counter terrorism policy to this day, and is likely to continue into the future.  
In the United Nation’s early days, there was therefore, a lack of support 
to internationally develop counter terrorism initiatives or a definition of terrorism. The 
result of which was that, the Security Council, treated terrorism as a largely localized 
national problem that in most cases did not constitute a threat to international peace and 
security.19 This pushed the fight against terrorism into the hands of national governments 
and out of the international security domain.  
 
Self-Determination was not the only factor influencing the development of the United 
Nations counter terrorism policy. Shortly after its creation the United Nations security 
apparatus was also in the grip of Cold War stalemate. A unanimous agreement on any 
matter was almost impossible, let alone one as controversial as terrorism.20  
This can be demonstrated by the Security Council’s actions during the Greek Civil War 
from 1947-1952. The Security Council had established, through Resolution 15,21 a 
Commission of Investigation to assess a complaint made by Greece stating that Albania, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had been inciting the insurgency in the north of Greece. There 
was evidence presented that both sides of the conflict were using unlawful tactics including 
terrorism. Terrorism was placed on the agenda by the Soviet Union but was quickly 
                                                
17 Seymour, G. (1975). Harry's Game. Random House. – Where the phrase is attributed.  
18 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 221 – see for other examples.  
19 Millar, E. R. (2007). Strengthening International Law and Global Implementation . In D. C. Lopez, Uniting 
Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat (pp. 51-83). 
Massachuetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology .at Chpt 3 pg 51 
20 Yordan, W. M. (2010). The Origins of United Nations Global Counter Terrorism System. Historia Actual 
Online , 22, 173. at pg 173 
21 United Nations Security Council Resolution 15, 19 December 1946  
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rejected by the United States, United Kingdom and France, who all cited that the issue was 
domestic in nature. The Commission instead recommended a permanent body to monitor 
the conflict, which was rejected by the Soviet Union. Therefore a stalemate had arisen 
again, which resulted in the lack of any detailed high-level discussion on counter terrorism. 
 In result, the Greek complaint was referred to the General Assembly, who established the 
UN Special Committee on the Balkans. Its mandate was however narrow and it was not 
empowered to examine the conduct of the parties. There were few useful outcomes from 
the Committee and it provided no guidance on dealing with terrorism.22 
This demonstrates that in the early period of the United Nations existence, it lacked the 
ability to deal practically with counter terrorism issues. As a result, domestic authorities 
almost exclusively dealt with terrorism during this time. Therefore there was little need for 
an international definition of terrorism to be drafted. 
 
However, from the 1960’s onwards a number of international Conventions began to 
develop which targeted specific acts of terrorism. These were created as a response to the 
rise in plane hijacking incidents throughout the 1960’s and 70’s and the Achille Lauro 
incident in 1985.23 The Conventions criminalised specific acts of terrorism such as 
violence at international airports or at sea and were developed on an ad hoc basis, as 
international dialogue arose around a specific offence. The Conventions were created by 
technical organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). 
These mark the start of a new United Nations approach to counter-terrorism, based on 
sectoral development.24 States were able, through this approach, to deal with terrorism, 
without engaging in any wider controversies. 
During this time there were also a number of limited discussions within the General 
Assembly, specifically by its Sixth Committee, who have remained actively engaged for 
many years.25 However, the political organizations, with broader mandates, like the 
General Assembly, were never successful in their actions and no comprehensive Treaty 
was ever created. 
                                                
22 Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac Books. At 
Pg 9 
23 Branch, T. P. (2010). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved 2014 from Counter Terrorism 
Legal Training Curriculum: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Training_Curriculum_Module2/English.pdf at pg 6 
24 ibid 
25 Committee, U. N. (n.d.). Retrieved March 2014 from http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/index.shtml 
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Although this demonstrates the beginnings of a United Nations counter terrorism policy, it 
is important to note, that the Conventions initially saw little ratification. They were not 
considered a priority for States. They simply mark an international response to an 
international concern, a specific act of terrorism.  
2.1.3 Terrorism as a threat to international peace and security 
 
The 1990’s saw the most drastic change in the United Nation’s responses to terrorism. 
Cold War divisions began to thaw and the organization was able to use its security 
apparatus more effectively. The Security Council, for the first time, actively discussed 
terrorism issues. In 1992 the Security Council members ‘expressed their deep concerns 
over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the international 
community to deal effectively with all such acts.’26  
This was followed by a period of economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by the 
council, against in particular, State support for terrorism. The United Nations had declared 
itself competent under its Charter, considering terrorism, for the first time, as a threat to 
international peace and security.27  
 
The first use of such sanctions was in 1992. These were imposed against Libya, as an 
international response to the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 airplane bombings. Resolution 
73128 was passed which demanded that Libya accept responsibility for the attacks and turn 
over for trial those indicted for the Pan Am 103 bombings.29 
Libya did not comply with the Resolution and so further punitive action was taken. 
Resolution 74830 imposed air and arms embargoes on Libya. A final Resolution, 
Resolution 88331, was passed in 1993, further strengthening these sanctions. It froze 
selected Libyan assets abroad and prohibited the export of oil related equipment to the 
country.  
                                                
26 United Nations Security Council Resolution 748, 31 March 1992 
27 Diaz-Paniagua, C. F. (2008). Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-
Terrorism Treaties 1997-2005. City University of New York , 1-804.At pg 34 
28 United Nations Security Council Resolution 731, 21 January 1992 
29 V. Lowe, A. J. (2008). The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and 
Practice since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press . at pg 217 
30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 748, 31 March 1992 
31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 883, 11 November 1993 
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These set of Resolutions represented a powerful statement that the international 
community was in agreement that the State support of terrorism violated universally 
accepted norms, despite the concept not being clearly defined.32 
The sanctions regime however resulted in years of deadlock and the Libyan economy 
suffered with rising inflation and unemployment levels as a result.33 The support for the 
sanctions slowly crumbled and in 1998 the members of the Organization of African Unity 
stated they would no longer comply, if no solutions were found by the end of that year.34 
Eventually, after, seven years Libya presented two suspects for trial in The Hague and the 
sanctions were suspended in 1999. One of the two Libyans was convicted of murder for 
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and given a life sentence.35 The sanctions were deemed 
as a relative success, with the 1996 US Patterns of Global Terrorism report suggesting, 
‘terrorism by Libya has been sharply reduced by UN sanctions’.36  
 
In 1996, similar action was taken against the Sudan. Resolution 104437 called for the 
country to extradite three individuals suspected of being involved in the failed 
assassination attempt on former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and to refrain from 
assisting, supporting or facilitating terrorist activities or providing safe haven to terrorist 
elements.38 Sudan, like Libya, failed to comply with such requests. In Resolution 1054, the 
Security Council stated that such non-compliance constituted a threat to international peace 
and security and imposed sanctions against the country.39  
The decision to impose such sanctions was not unanimous. Russia’s representative Sergey 
Lavrov stated that: 
 
‘The members of the Security Council...have on several occasions come to realize that the 
arbitrary application of sanctions is essentially flawed when there are no clearly formulated 
                                                
32  Farrall, J. M. (2007). United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. At pg 299 
33 Collins, S. (2010). Dissuading State Support of terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? An Analysis of Dissuasion 
Measures Employed Against Libya. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , 27 (1). At pg 11  
34 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 155 
35 Lockerbie Trial Overview. (n.d.). From The Guardian Online: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jan/31/lockerbie.derekbrownardian.com/uk/2001/jan/31/lockerbie.dere
kbrown> 
36 US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (1996), Publication 10535 (Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1996)  
37 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1044, 31 January 1996  
38 Farrall, J. M. (2007). United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.at pg 353 
39  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1054, 26 April 1996  
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criteria and conditions governing their imposition and their lifting…we are absolutely in 
favour of involving the Security Council in a real struggle against international 
terrorism...but we are against attempts to make use of this in order to punish certain 
regimes or in order to attain other political goals of one or more Member States.’40 
 
China also expressed similar uncertainty with the action.41  
The sanctions imposed were weaker, than those implemented against Libya, due to the 
disagreement within the Council and because of the political and humanitarian situation in 
the Sudan at the time.42 They were diplomatic and required that Member States reduce the 
number of staff at missions and consular posts in the country and that international and 
regional organizations refrain from holding any conferences there.43 These weak sanctions 
had little effect and so Resolution 1070 proposed an aviation ban, if within 90 days the 
country had not bowed to international pressure.44 This never came into effect, with many 
States still opposing the ban because of the humanitarian consequences that may result.  
The government involvement in the assassination attempt remains unresolved and the 
sanctions were more symbolic in nature. In 1996, the Sudanese government did inform the 
Security Council that it had requested a number of individuals, including Osama bin 
Laden, leave the country. The sanctions that existed were lifted in 2001, in return for the 
country’s cooperation in the ‘war against terrorism’.45 
 
The increasing use of sanctions, especially in regard to international terrorism, was 
becoming more and more controversial. Therefore, in 1999, when the need for a new set of 
terrorism related sanctions arose, the Security Council attempted to create a more robust, 
and effective regime. This was aimed at the actions of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and to 
secure the surrender of Osama bin Laden. It also sent a further general message that the 
support of international terrorism was no longer acceptable.46  
                                                
40 United Nations Security Council Meeting 3660 April 26 1996 UNSPV 3660, 1996a 
41 Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac Books. At 
pg 47 
42 Askari, H. (2003). Economic Sanctions: Examining their Philosophy and Efficacy . Westport: Praeger 
Publishers.At pg 55 
43 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1054, 26 April 1996 
44  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1070, 16 August 1996.  At pg 2 Para 4  
45 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 156 
46  ibid at pg 157 
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Resolution 1267, was adopted unanimously with only a short debate and it imposed the 
initial sanctions against the Taliban in Afghanistan. This Resolution is significant, as it is 
the first to deal not only with State sponsored terrorism, but the actions of individuals and 
groups.47 It established the 1267 Committee, which was tasked with monitoring and 
ensuring compliance. States were obliged to report to the Committee, outlining the steps 
they had taken to implement the Resolution. The sanctions included an obligation on States 
to freeze Taliban assets and deny the permission of Taliban aircraft to depart or land on 
States territory. These were only to come into effect in November 1999, if the Taliban 
chose not to surrender Osama bin Laden. This action was not taken so the sanctions came 
into effect on that day.  
The initial sanctions did not result in significant compliance and so the sanctions package 
was strengthened in 2000 by Resolution 1333. This added an arms embargo and extended 
the asset freeze and flight ban to those associated with Al Qaeda.48 This Resolution 
included an additional committee of experts, who were tasked with recommending how the 
arms embargo and the closing of terrorist camps should be monitored. They called for total 
commitment of all Member States; in particular those bordering Afghanistan, who they 
outlined, should be provided with local support teams. These were however never 
provided.49 Although the sanctions regime became increasingly broad it did not seem to 
influence the Taliban. Some of these sanctions still exist today, despite the US led military 
campaign in 2001. 
There were many reasons for such a failure. The Taliban firstly did not operate within the 
global economy, with much of their income coming from the black market, specifically the 
opium and heroin trade. Therefore, any economic sanctions had little effect. Arms were 
also already plentiful, so the arms embargo did little to remove them. The Taliban was able 
to remain almost immune to outside influence.50  
 
These various sanction regimes throughout the 1990’s demonstrate that the Security 
Council was becoming more and more engaged in counter terrorism issues. Terrorism had 
become an act that could be countered through collective international actions, despite its 
lack of mention within the UN Charter. Chapter VII had been engaged, allowing for more 
                                                
47 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, 15 October 1999.  
48 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333, 18 December 2000. 
49 Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac Books.At 
p 69 for more detail 
50 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 157 
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robust, even military responses to international terrorism. This is significant, since it is still 
a concept yet to be fully defined. 
The sanctions did however, like many international initiatives, suffer from implementation 
issues, with States unwilling or lacking the resources to implement the Resolutions 
effectively.51 The Taliban sanctions regime also demonstrates that this approach is not as 
effective against non-State entities, which are typically not a functioning part of the 
international system.  
 
During this period, the General Assembly was also developing its approach. In 1996, 
through Resolution 51/210, it created a new forum for discussion, establishing an Ad Hoc 
Committee to elaborate new international conventions on terrorism.52 These included the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings53, the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism54 and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism55. These 
Conventions developed the framework of international terrorism conventions into areas 
that are more wide ranging than previously seen. Despite the Conventions still seeing low 
implementation rates, their development demonstrates that the United Nations was 
becoming more open and progressive towards counter terrorism issues during the 1990’s. 
The Committee still exists today and its mandate is constantly revised and renewed by the 
General Assembly. The Committee has reported every year since 1997. Since 2000 it has 
begun to draft a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.56  
The creation of such an instrument has been strongly supported by a number of Southern 
Hemisphere States. The Convention’s initial draft was presented to the Committee by the 
delegation of India, which stressed the need to create a homogenous and all-encompassing 
legal framework for the prevention, repression, and elimination of international terrorism 
                                                
51 W. Messmer & C. Yordan, ‘The Origins of United Nations Global Counter Terrorism System’ 22 Historia 
Actual Online 173 (2010) at pg 175 
52 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17th December 1996. 
53 United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,” 
15 December 1997, No. 37517  
54 United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism,” 13 April 2005, A/59/766 
55United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism,” 9 December 1999, No. 38349 
56 United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee. Working Group on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, Report, 1,10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/L.2 (19th October 2000)  
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in all its aspects.57 This draft has now formed the basis of all further discussions on the 
Convention and is constantly being developed.   
2.2 United Nations counter terrorism policy after September 11th 2001  
 
The September 11th 2001 attacks had a devastating impact on the world and led to an 
overhaul of attitudes and a permanent change in the position of the United Nations in 
regards to terrorism prevention.  
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan articulated the world’s feeling at the time 
stating, ‘A terrorist attack on one country is an attack on humanity as a whole. All nations 
of the world must work together to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice.’58 
Terrorism was therefore now fully on the world stage. This led to an increase in counter 
terrorism initiatives being produced by the United Nations. Developments have been seen 
both within the Security Council and the General Assembly. This section will discuss each 
of these United Nation’s organs post September 11th contributions to the United Nations 
counter terrorism policy.  
2.2.1. The Security Council 
 
The Security Council reacted immediately to the September 11th attacks, requiring States 
to undertake wide-ranging and comprehensive measures against terrorism.  
Resolution 1368 was passed on 12th September 2001.59 In this Resolution the Security 
Council recognised the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as a 
legitimate response to terrorist actions.60 This is highly significant, as it implies that the 
attacks triggered self-defence provisions, despite the Security Council, at the time, not 
being aware who had perpetrated the attacks.61 It has been used for example, by Russia to 
justify pre-emptive actions against Chechen rebels in Georgia in 2012.62 Further, the 
Resolution stated that the international community should ‘redouble their efforts to prevent 
and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of 
                                                
57 India ‘Statement’ U.N. GAOR 51st Sess. Sixth Comm. 30th mtg., 31-34 U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.30 (1st 
November 1996) 
58 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Record, UN Doc. SPV/4370, September 12, 2001 
59 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, 12th September 2001 
60 ibid 
61 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 161 
62 UNwire. (2002). Russia Writes UN, OSCE Invoking Right to Self-Defence. From UNwire: 
www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020912/28865_story.asp 
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the relevant international anti-terrorist Conventions and Security Council Resolutions.’63 
This represents full Security Council support for the Conventions developed by the 
General Assembly and Technical Organisations. 
 
Following this, the Security Council passed Resolution 137364, which is hailed as the most 
significant of them all.65 The Resolution is far reaching and contains a number of 
obligations, binding on all Member States, that could easily also be found within an 
international Convention. 
The Resolution calls upon States to prevent the commission of terrorist acts and deny safe 
haven to terrorists and their supporters. It additionally requires that States prosecute and 
punish terrorists, cooperate with other States in criminal and investigative proceedings 
involving terrorism, improve effective border controls, suppress recruitment and prevent 
the attainment of weapons and explosives.66 It also outlines that States should criminalize 
terrorist fund raising, freeze assets of terrorists and prevent terrorists and their supporters 
from using financial institutions.67  
Many of the elements of the Resolution are found in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999. This Convention had not entered into 
force pre-September 11, being ratified by only four States.68  However, since Resolution 
1373, many of its articles had now become binding on all United Nations members without 
their consent.69 The effect of this will be considered in the later Chapters of this discussion. 
The Resolution itself is legislative in nature, but not drafted in a manner as meticulous as 
an international Convention. Many elements are left undefined, which allows States to 
interpret the Resolution at a domestic level, but also leads to international ambiguity. For 
example, this issue can be demonstrated in regards to the criminalization of terrorist 
financing. States are able to fund organizations, deemed legitimate by their domestic 
                                                
63 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, 12 September 2001 
64 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001 
65 See Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac 
Books. At pg 77 
66 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001 
67 ibid 
68 Treaties, U. N. (n.d.). Depositary Information - International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 1999. Retrieved March 2014 from 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
11&chapter=18&lang=en#EndDec. 
69 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 161 
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definition or own political goals. Other States may however criminalise the same entities.70 
This prevents uniformity of actions. 
Another point to note is the Resolution’s lack of definition, or common criteria regarding 
terrorist acts. Terrorism is simply approached as a self-explanatory concept.71 The 
Resolution imposes far-reaching obligations on States, but this key definition was left to 
each State to establish domestically.  
 
This demonstrates the difficulty that the international community has had in drafting a 
definition of international terrorism, with even the universally condemned events of 
September 11th not leading to any further clarification on the concept.  
In addition to these definitional problems, the obligations within Resolution 1373 are 
costly to implement, and many States do not have the resources to carry out the 
requirements, or do not wish to do so. Many of these States are those that are most likely to 
attract terrorist organizations, either due to their lack of governmental control or lack of 
cohesion with the international community.72 
 
In order to monitor the implementation of such a comprehensive and controversial 
Resolution, the Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee [hereafter 
CTC].73 The Committee obliges States to report on their implementation of the Resolution. 
The CTC in 2005 also began to undertake country visits, focusing on the Resolution’s 
implementation and evaluating any assistance that States may need to improve this.74  
The CTC is assisted by its Executive Directorate [hereafter CTED]. This body produces 
preliminary implementation assessments that are able to provide a snap shot of the counter 
terrorism situation in each country, based on information reported by the country, other 
international organizations and public sources.75  
                                                
70  ibid at pg 162 
71 Comras, V. (2010). Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Potomac Books. At 
pg 55 
72 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 12 
73 See http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/aboutus.html for more information  
74 Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy. (2007, June). 42nd Conference on the United 
Nations of the Next Decade. Stanley Foundation.at pg 14 
75  Branch, T. P. (2010). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved 2014 from Counter Terrorism 
Legal Training Curriculum: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Training_Curriculum_Module2/English.pdfpg 17 
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The CTC does not however have the resources or capabilities needed to comprehensively 
monitor or carry out its entire mandate across all 193 Member States.76 It is seen as a more 
analytical body, which helps to establish a network of information sharing and cooperative 
executive action.77 There is still considerable effort required before all Member States 
implement the Resolution and all its elements fully.  
 
The Resolutions, outlined within this section, demonstrate that since September 11th, the 
United Nations Security Council has been active in developing a number of comprehensive 
measures to combat terrorism, being more involved than ever before. However, despite this 
increased involvement, the Security Council has not yet agreed upon an international 
definition of terrorism. Therefore leaving the Council open to continued criticism.  
2.2.2. The General Assembly 
 
Left in the wake of this extensive Security Council action has been the General Assembly.  
This United Nations organ has been active for decades discussing counter terrorism 
matters. Its first extensive dealing with the topic began in 1996 with the establishment of 
an Ad Hoc Committee on international terrorism through Resolution 51/210. Since 2000, 
this Ad Hoc Committee has been negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism. The discussion will now move on to look in more detail at these 
negotiations. Following on from this it will then outline the General Assembly’s most 
essential contributions to the United Nations counter terrorism policy; the Global Counter 
Terrorism Strategy and the Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism.  
 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 
 
Since 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee has been negotiating the Comprehensive Convention 
on International Terrorism, with discussions still ongoing. The September 11th attacks 
impacted significantly upon the discourse, increasing the need for such an instrument to be 
successfully drafted, in order to rationalise the increasing number of Conventions and 
Resolutions that were being developed as a result of the ‘War on Terror’.  
                                                
76 T.Weiss, J. &. (2004). Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. At pg 163 
77 Press Briefing by Chairman of the CTC, October 19 2001, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373 
under Open Briefings.  
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Despite this, at the time of writing, 14 years after discussions began within this committee, 
an internationally agreed upon comprehensive convention and accompanying definition of 
terrorism is yet to be adopted.  
The Committee does currently have a draft definition of terrorism. This draft has gone 
through various changes since negotiations began, reflecting the different positions of 
United Nations Member States. It is not necessary for the purpose of this discussion to go 
through all such formulations, it will instead simply outline the most recent.  
As of the 2013 session of the Ad Hoc Committee the definition of terrorism within draft 
Article 2, stood as follows: 
‘Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention if that 
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily 
injury to any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place 
of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an 
infrastructure facility or to the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or 
systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in 
major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.’78 
 
This definition is also supported by draft Article 3 that provides for a direct recognition of 
the ‘rights, obligations and responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under 
international law’ and excludes ‘the activities of armed forces during armed conflict’ from 
the definition’s scope.79  
These two articles are closely related, with draft Article 2 covering the positive acts of 
terrorism and draft Article 3 providing for the necessary exclusions.  
The definition takes a number of its different elements from other Conventions, in 
particular those formulated by the Ad Hoc Committee itself, including the Financing 
Convention.  
 
                                                
78 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17th December 
1996, Sixteenth Session 8-12 April 2013. U.N Doc A/68/37 
79 ibid 
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The negotiations within the Committee are still however impacted by a number of 
reoccurring obstacles that are likely to halt any further development or the adoption of the 
above mentioned definition.  
The first obstacle is the position within the definition of the Right to Self-Determination. A 
number of delegations participating in the Comprehensive Convention negotiations have 
stressed, that any definition of terrorism needs to distinguish clearly between acts of 
terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation and colonial or 
alien domination in the exercise of the Right to Self-Determination.80 Mainly the members 
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [hereafter OIC] argued for this inclusion. 
Traditional western powers and India opposed this idea, stating that all terrorist acts should 
be deemed as unjustifiable.81 
The attacks of September 11th 2001 only sought to entrench these strong views. States that 
had been victims of terrorist attacks fought more forcefully against such an exception. 
Islamic countries on the other hand feared that the new ‘War on Terror’ might jeopardize 
the fights of those seeking refuge from alien domination within countries such as Palestine 
and Kashmir.82  
During the most recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee in 2013, the issue was raised 
again. The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the OIC, stated that the 
Organization supported a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism that addressed the 
root causes of terrorism, including unlawful use of force, foreign occupation, and denial of 
the right of people living under foreign occupation to Self-Determination. It also included 
political and economic injustices, and political marginalization.  He reiterated the need to 
make a distinction between terrorism, and the exercise of the legitimate right of peoples to 
resist foreign occupation.83  
This right also affects the discussion on what any armed forces caveat within the definition 
should outlaw. States in favor of the inclusion of a Self-Determination exception wish for 
the actions of occupiers, which clearly violate International Humanitarian Law, to be 
provided for under the Convention and so excluded from such a caveat. This was not a 
plausible inclusion for States such as the United States of America.84 
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In addition to the Self Determination debate, some delegations maintain that terrorism 
should not be associated with any particular religion, race, faith, theology, value set, 
culture, society or group. The representatives of Iran and Egypt highlighted this issue in 
recent discussions, on behalf of the Non-Alignment Movement and the OIC respectively.85  
It seems that such a debate currently has little chance of ending, either with a compromise 
or a strong legal definition of terrorism.  
 
The delegations basic positions on these obstacles continue to be reiterated at all Ad Hoc 
Committee and General Assembly Working Group meetings. States stress the importance 
of the creation of the Convention but seem to have lost hope of any positive conclusion.86 
These positions are also heavily influenced by political tensions and standpoints, especially 
since the September 11th attacks. These consistently bog down the success of this 
negotiation process and are unlikely to be eradicated any time soon. 
The Ad Hoc committee set out on a ‘quest to find a common understanding of terrorism’87 
but no such understanding has been found within its current discussions. 
 
This thesis therefore proposes that the international community should instead be looking 
at other pragmatic alternatives and developments within the United Nations systems that 
allow for such an understanding, in lieu of any agreement within this committee.  
These alternatives will now be outlined and it will be demonstrated that throughout these 
years of negotiations, other, more comprehensive instruments have been created by the 
General Assembly outside of these Ad Hoc Committee Comprehensive Convention 
discussions.  
 
Global Counter Terrorism Strategy 
 
The Global Counter Terrorism Strategy is the first essential instrument developed by the 
General Assembly after September 11th 2001.  
The idea of this Strategy was first discussed at the high-level panel on threats, challenges 
and change, in 2004. The panel drew attention in its report, entitled ‘A More Secure 
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World- Our Shared Responsibility’ to the eroding of human rights and the rule of law by 
the ongoing war on terrorism.88 It suggested the idea of a comprehensive strategy that 
addresses the roots of terrorism, whilst still allowing these elements to be protected. This 
would maintain a broader outlook than the coercive measures that had been so commonly 
used.89  
 
Following this report, on the anniversary of the Madrid train bombings, the then Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, launched his proposals for such a strategy, outlining five main 
elements. The first being to dissuade groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve 
their goals, the second to deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks, the third to 
deter States from supporting terrorists, the fourth to develop State capacity to prevent 
terrorism and the fifth to defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.90 The aim 
of such a strategy was to help sustain the political will of States to maintain the fight 
against terrorism on the global agenda. It also aimed to provide a practical outline to assist 
States in their counter-terrorism efforts, whether nationally, regionally or globally.91  
 
Following this speech, there was an increased international impetus to streamline actions. 
For the first time, at the World Summit in September 2005, all Member States agreed on a 
clear and unqualified condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. They also agreed to make 
every effort to create a Comprehensive Convention on combating international terrorism, 
along with a common definition within the Ad Hoc Committee.  The States additionally 
encouraged the General Assembly to further develop the elements of a Global Strategy, to 
promote coordinated, consistent and comprehensive responses to counter terrorism at all 
levels. 92 
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90 Secretary-General keynote address to the closing plenary of the international summit on democracy, 
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91 United Nations. (2014.). Retrieved 2014 from Global Counter Terrorism Strategy: 
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In response, the Secretary General released a report entitled ‘United Against Terrorism: 
Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.’93 Each of the previous five 
elements were refined and additional measures suggested. These additional measures 
related specifically to the improvement of the United Nations, to internally strengthen and 
develop its capacity to deal with the threat of international terrorism. 94 
Using this as a basis for discussion, on the 11th May 2006 the General Assembly began 
consultations. These resulted in the adoption of the United Nations Global Counter 
Terrorism Strategy on the 8th September 2006. 
 
The final strategy is comprised of a comprehensive Resolution and an annexed plan of 
action. It condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, reiterating much of the 
World Summit and Secretary General’s discussions. 95 
The Plan of Action contains a number of steps that States have resolved to take, in order to 
better combat international terrorism. The 60th General Assembly President Jan Eliasson 
stated that: 
“The Plan of Action sets out a number of practical and operational measures that will 
enhance our efforts to fight terrorism. These include the call for Member States as well as 
the United Nations system to step up their efforts and strengthen their counter terrorism 
measures in a number of concrete areas.”96 
This includes instructing Member States to become parties to the many international 
Conventions and Resolutions against terrorism. 
 
Additionally, the strategy establishes four pillars of action. 
The first outlines measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. 
This includes resolving to continue to use and strengthen the capacities of the United 
Nations to promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations, cultures, 
peoples and religions.  
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The second pillar outlines measures to be taken to prevent and combat terrorism. States 
through this have resolved to refrain from encouraging terrorist activities and increase their 
international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators.  
The third pillar outlines measures to build State’s capacity to prevent and combat terrorism 
and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in terrorism prevention. It additionally 
encourages Member States to make more voluntary contributions to United Nation’s 
counter-terrorism cooperation and technical assistance projects.  
The fourth and final pillar involves measures to ensure respect for human rights and the 
rule of law. It recognises that effective counter terrorism measures and human rights are 
not conflicting goals but are complimentary and mutually reinforcing. It also includes the 
promotion of the rights of victims of terrorism, something, which is a strong theme 
throughout the strategy.97 
 
Following its development, the framework has been reviewed periodically. The first 
review was on the 8th September 2010. In another Resolution adopted by consensus, 
Member States reiterated their condemnation of international terrorism and reaffirmed 
their responsibility in implementing the strategy. The second followed in 2012 with similar 
success. 98 
This continuing approval of the strategy by all 193 Member States is extremely important 
to add much-needed legitimacy to United Nations counter terrorism policy. It also allows 
for greater opportunities for the United Nations to work together with regional 
organizations, civil society and the private sector in their efforts, resulting in a synthesized 
international approach.99 
 
Despite the Strategy representing a great commitment by States, there is undoubtedly still a 
gap between international rhetoric and the reality of a States practice domestically. The 
Strategy does not have the authoritative status of an international Treaty, and although 
States resolve to adopt it, it is not binding and there is little enforcement in place.  
It additionally does not contain an independent definition of international terrorism. It does 
however make reference to the United Nations international counter terrorism instruments, 
which as this thesis contends includes such a definition, within Article 2(1) of the 
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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The 
recognition of such a definition could further strengthen the Global Strategy and increase 
its legitimacy.  
The approach of the strategy is also “one size fits all” and although there was international 
consensus, there is a feeling that such a strategy is very northern hemisphere focused. This 
is despite most of the casualties of terrorism being from the southern hemisphere.100 These 
countries may not have the capacity to establish such a strategy. For example, to prevent 
the financing of terrorism, many rigorous and costly financial controls need to be put in 
place. This demonstrates a lack of understanding of the cultural differences and needs of 
Member States.101  
 
There is therefore still a long road forward to ensure global implementation of the Strategy.  
This should not however diminish the success of the General Assembly. The Strategy 
represents the first international agreement on comprehensive matters of counter terrorism 
and demonstrates that States, although reluctant, are beginning to realise that an 
international, United Nations led way forward is important in the future fight against 
terrorism.  
 
Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism 
 
The Strategy also importantly makes reference to another essential General Assembly 
initiative. It requires that States will ratify or implement the Conventions and Resolutions 
included in the Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism.102 This Framework is 
significant to this thesis’ main claim, as it contains the only definition of international 
terrorism in force, within one of its Conventions.  
The Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism is not a legal phenomenon but is a set 
of instruments, adopted at the global level, which contain a series of legally binding 
standards for States to prevent and counter international terrorism. These were discussed 
briefly within this Chapter, and have developed from 1963 onwards and cover a multitude 
of different terrorism related areas.  
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In this context the term ‘universal’ does not intend to mean that each Convention is 
uniformly binding. It instead seeks to describe that such agreements are open to all 
Member States of the United Nations or affiliated Agencies, rather than being restricted 
regionally or aimed at specific groups. 103 
The Framework itself includes a variety of elements which all aim to increase international 
cooperation and promote the rule of law, through a criminal justice approach to terrorism 
prevention. It is made up of two distinct categories, six Security Council Resolutions104 
binding on all Member States, and 18 Conventions, Protocols and Amendments105 binding 
on those who are parties.  
The Conventions demonstrate the sectoral approach taken by the United Nations and each 
belong to different thematic areas, reflecting a number of varied terrorist offences. These 
include transport related matters, chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear terrorism 
and terrorism financing. This approach demonstrates the political sensitivity of the 
international approach towards terrorism, as presented above in the historical overview.  
 
The Conventions are all built upon a common structure, which is then moulded by specific 
offences reflecting each thematic area.  
The jurisdictional scope of the 18 Conventions has been open to debate. They are used to 
prosecute the acts of non-State agents, but State terrorism is not directly discussed. The 
Conventions adopted after 1999 include a preamble outlining that the Member States of the 
United Nations reaffirm their ‘unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and 
practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable wherever and by whomever 
committed.’106 This could suggest that acts of State terrorism can be prosecuted and that 
the status of the perpetrator is irrelevant. However, they also provide provisions outlining 
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that the Convention shall not affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States 
and individuals under international law. In particular this refers to the purposes of the 
United Nations, International Humanitarian Law and other relevant Conventions. Some of 
these provisions provide immunity from prosecution for certain State agents. The scope is 
therefore still open to interpretation, dependent on the particular case.107 
The common structure that all Conventions are built upon includes a number of different 
mechanisms that reflect the criminal justice aspects of terrorism prevention.  
This includes, limiting each Convention to transnational cases, demonstrating the support 
for international cooperation. For example, Article 3 of the Financing Convention states 
that “This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, 
the alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory of that State 
and no other State has the basis…to exercise jurisdiction.”108  
The Conventions also include common mechanisms on jurisdiction. One of the most 
important elements is the principle of aut dedere aut judicare or extradite and prosecute. 
This provides that those who commit any of the terrorist crimes included in the 
Conventions are either brought to trial by their own Governments, or are extradited to a 
country that is willing to bring them to trial.109 The State should, if not extraditing, submit 
to prosecution without exception. The aim of such a provision is to deny terrorists safe 
havens and make the world inhospitable to them and their supporters. This principle needs 
to work jointly with the other jurisdictional mechanisms included in the Convention, such 
as mutual legal assistance. This is important to facilitate the exchange of information, 
necessary for such procedures, such as providing evidence to the prosecuting State.  
 
This common structure of the Framework is then supplemented by the specific terrorism 
offence that the Conventions cover. The offence of terrorist financing will be discussed in 
more detail in the following Chapter.  
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The outlining of these offences makes each Convention unique, whilst their common 
framework ties them together.  
This thesis intends to suggest, that such a common framework should be developed further 
to include the definition of international terrorism found within Article 2(1) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999. This has 
the potential to add clarity and legitimacy to the framework as a whole. 
 
The General Assembly’s Global Strategy and a number of Security Council Resolutions 
call for the ratification of all of these 18 Conventions.110 Some States have been reluctant 
to do so for numerous reasons; the most prominent being that States do not see all 18 
Conventions as specifically relevant to themselves. A landlocked State, for example may 
not feel the need to implement maritime obligations. Technical assistance and monitoring 
bodies such as the CTC, suggest that such States take note of the international cooperation 
elements of each Convention. They contend that a national of a landlocked State may 
commit a maritime crime outside the country or may become victim to such a crime. 
Therefore all Conventions are deemed by the United Nations to be necessary and relevant 
to all Member States.111  
 
This demonstrates the importance of developing the monitoring capability and technical 
assistance, provided for States, in order to implement the framework. This is outlined in 
the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in paragraph III-7 of the Plan of Action.112  
It empowers the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime with the task of providing States with technical legal assistance on the 
implementation of the framework. This intends to aid all nations with the implementation 
of such a framework, building capacities and abilities of legal officials and governments. It 
is important that such a strategy has underpinning support as it helps narrow the gap 
between southern and northern nation’s capabilities. It is able to highlight the importance 
and benefits to each State, encouraging ratification and universal acceptance. 
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Six Security Council Resolutions then compliment these Conventions.113 These, as stated 
above, are binding on all United Nations Member States. They therefore send a strong 
message that international terrorism is wrong and that mechanisms should be put in place 
to cooperate internationally. Each Resolution however does not provide much detail on 
how this can be achieved.  
This demonstrates the importance of the creation of the Universal Framework, allowing all 
United Nations counter terrorism instruments to be seen together, mutually reinforcing one 
another. This could be strengthened further if such a framework included a definition of 
international terrorism. 
 
The Framework is of course still dependent upon national implementations, relying on 
each State to have stable national institutions for full implementation and to have 
appropriate policies in place to allow for full international cooperation. The criminal 
code/policy of each State and their legal traditions dictates how each Convention or 
Resolution is implemented and how each crime is prosecuted.  
This is a necessary evil as there is no international tribunal that can prosecute terrorist 
actions. The International Criminal Court is granted jurisdiction over many crimes, 
including genocide and war crimes, but terrorism, probably due to its controversial nature 
and lack of definition was rejected during Rome Statute negotiations.114 Therefore 
international law takes the position of a guide rather than an adjudicator in international 
counter terrorism policy. This inevitably results in differing implementation and some lack 
of uniformity.  
 
The Universal Framework is an important instrument in order to aid in the organization of 
the United Nations counter terrorism Conventions and Resolutions. In place of having a 
Comprehensive Convention, this framework is able to provide an alternative that reflects 
the historical roots of United Nations counter terrorism policy and allows for States to have 
sovereignty on the topic and its implementation. As this thesis will later demonstrate, it 
may also include a definition of terrorism, fit for purpose, to provide legitimacy to the 
Framework and policy as a whole. 
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The use of such a tool is, at present, the best way forward in lieu of international cohesion 
on the Comprehensive Conventions definition within the Ad Hoc Committee. 
2.3 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has outlined the growth of the United Nations role in counter terrorism over 
the past half century. Today, the United Nations is more involved than ever, and its 
policies are becoming increasingly important to the counter terrorism considerations of all 
States. Its mandates and expertise in security, development and its facilitation of 
international cooperation, allow it to contribute to and bring together all important aspects 
in the eradication of international terrorism. The increased acceptance by Member States, 
through the creation of the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and the Universal 
Framework Against Terrorism, demonstrates a realization that cross-border cooperation is 
now necessary to deal with a cross-border crime such as terrorism. An international 
compromise has developed between State’s political, legal and cultural reservations on the 
definition and scope of terrorism, when applying and developing this Global Strategy and 
Universal Framework. This Chapter has demonstrated that such ability to compromise is 
lacking within the Ad Hoc Committee discussions, which have been increasingly bogged 
down by political considerations.  
The General Assembly’s strong alternative policy, outlined above, needs now to be 
strengthened further, through increased international recognition for the potential 
definition of terrorism that it contains.  
 
The Next Chapter will examine in more detail the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999. This Convention is found within the 
Universal Legal Framework and includes the only international legal definition of 
terrorism.  
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3. International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 
 
The thesis will now move on to examine in more detail the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 and a number of its important 
provisions. This Convention forms a part of the Universal Legal Framework against 
Terrorism. It is also the only counter terrorism Convention in force that contains a 
definition of an act of terrorism. This definition will be analyzed in depth within Chapter 
four, where it will be applied to a wider context and proposed as a practical option for an 
independent United Nations definition of terrorism.  
The current Chapter however, aims to first provide the context and background for the next 
Chapters discussion. It will examine the development of the Financing Convention and 
how the definition is applied within its current context. It seeks to add further legitimacy to 
the definition by praising and critiquing the Convention that it is taken from, analysing 
why this Convention has gained such a high level of international acceptance.  
3.1 Legislative history 
3.1.1 Agreeing to draft  
 
In the early 1990’s the financing of terrorism became a topic of interest on the world stage. 
States were beginning to realise that in order to end international terrorism, preventing its 
financing was a necessary step forward. Financing is the lifeblood of any organization and 
strengthening its international regulation could prevent further large-scale attacks and the 
growth of international terrorist organizations.115  
Anne Clunan suggests that terrorist financing includes two sets of financial activities.116 
The first is the purchase of items such as food, transport or goods like mobile telephones 
used in the preparation of bombs or for communication. These are perfectly legal until 
linked to a specific criminal act. The second represents intangible funds, used in the 
support of terrorist operations, training and propaganda. These can be raised through 
illegal means such as drug trafficking or arms smuggling but also legitimately through 
charities or humanitarian groups.  
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These two areas of funding cover a diverse range of activities that need to be adequately 
addressed by any countering terrorist Financing Convention. 
 
A number of different international and regional organizations began discussions on 
preventing terrorist financing during this period. They include the United Nations Security 
Council and General Assembly, the European Union and the G-8.117  
In 1996 the General Assembly established, through Resolution 51/210,118 an Ad Hoc 
Committee that was tasked to further elaborate the international counter terrorism 
conventions and eventually to develop a comprehensive legal framework dealing with 
international terrorism and its accompanying definition of terrorism.  The Resolution stated 
that Member States should ‘take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate 
domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether such 
financing is direct or indirect.’119 Financing was therefore initially left for States to deal 
with domestically. The Ad Hoc Committee’s mandate was instead focused upon 
developing Conventions on other areas of counter terrorism.  
 
Despite this, in 1998 the French delegation introduced the concept of the Financing 
Convention into the international domain. The Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Hubert 
Védrine, called upon the General Assembly to adopt an instrument to prosecute those who 
finance and instigate terrorist attacks.120 The movement to negotiate the Financing 
Convention was supported by a number of high profile delegations including the United 
States, Russia and the European Union.121  
Following this action, the General Assembly through Resolution 53/108 of 1999 decided 
that the Ad Hoc Committee ‘should elaborate a draft International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Financing to supplement related existing international 
instruments.’122 
                                                
117 The Group of Seven plus the Russian Federation see Aust, A. (2001). Counter-Terrorism - A New 
Approach: The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law , 5, 285-306. At pg 286 
118 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 December 1996 
119 General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 December 1996 at I 3 (f) 
120 France (H. Védrine), “Statement” U.N. GAOR 53rd Sess. 11th plenary meeting. 18 U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.11 
(23rd September, 1998)  
121 Diaz-Paniagua, C. F. (2008). Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-
Terrorism Treaties 1997-2005. City University of New York , 1-804. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1968150 at pg 436 
122  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/108,  26th January 1999 at para 11 
 33 
The Financing Convention was one of three Conventions to be produced by the Ad Hoc 
Committee. The first was the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings adopted by the United Nations in 1997 and second was the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted in 2005. These all 
have a place within the Universal Legal Framework Against Terrorism and are based upon 
the same common framework. 
The widening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to cover the Financing Convention 
was however somewhat controversial. The Committee’s original mandate was intended to 
address first the Terrorist Bombings Convention, then the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 
and then be completed by the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism. The development of a Comprehensive Convention has its foundations in a 
proposal supported by India and championed by much of the southern hemisphere. 123 
The French introduction of a Financing Convention sought to disrupt this mandate and 
further the already extremely sectoral approach taken by the United Nations. India 
however was willing to concede, providing that immediately after the creation of the 
Terrorist Financing Convention, discussions on a Comprehensive Convention would be 
taken on a priority basis.124  
3.1.2 The drafting process 
 
Therefore, General Assembly Resolution 53/108 had set the stage for the Financing 
Convention’s drafting and the Ad Hoc Committee started its considerations in March of 
1999.  
France had highlighted that the aim of the Convention was to fill the gap in international 
law by creating an international convention that countered the acts of those who supplied 
funds or sponsored terrorist acts.125 The draft convention was intended to punish those 
financing terrorist acts but also to prevent such financing through increased international 
cooperation, specifically through mutual legal assistance. For an international problem 
such as terrorism an international solution was considered essential. France’s original text, 
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drafted primarily by domestic lawyers, was then submitted to the Committee to be further 
elaborated through the discussion process.126  
 
The Committee’s discussions included a more diverse mix of States than previous 
negotiations had seen. Financial transaction hubs, whose interests may be directly affected 
by such a Convention, were especially active. This included Switzerland, who at the time 
was not a member of the United Nations and was granted observer status to participate in 
the Committee’s negotiations.127  
 
The drafting discussions were unique in that they focused not on the Financing Convention 
as a whole but on its specialised articles. The common structure of the Universal 
Framework Against Terrorism had been discussed in detail many times before and by this 
Committee itself in its drafting of the Terrorist Bombing Convention.128 Therefore detailed 
negotiations on this area were not considered necessary. The negotiations instead focused 
upon the various definitions central to the Convention, including that of funds and that of 
terrorism itself. It also included factors relating to the criminalization of financing as an 
offence, the liability of legal entities, the freezing and seizure of funds and international 
cooperation in relation to financial matters.129  
 
During this drafting process some States questioned whether such a Convention was 
needed, suggesting that individuals who financed terrorism could be considered 
accomplices and dealt with as ancillary offenders under the other Universal Framework 
Conventions.130  
The International Monetary Fund [hereafter IMF], in its publication ‘Suppressing 
Financing of Terrorism’,131 counteracts these concerns by suggesting a number of reasons 
why counter terrorism financing measures are necessary and relevant. The IMF highlight 
that terrorism itself has a unique character and is based upon the promotion of certain 
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ideologies. All counter terrorism conventions should focus on the need to prevent the 
development of extremist groups and the promotion of these ideologies. This is the case 
regardless of the actual planning of a physical terrorist act, especially as finance could be 
provided for actions such as recruitment or training. A principal physical act such as 
hijacking may not be attempted or realized for a significant amount of time.  
This represents a problem to those who promote the use of ancillary offences to deal with 
terrorist financing, especially since the Universal Framework Conventions give much 
sovereignty in application to State parties and their domestic laws. In many domestic 
jurisdictions, for example, ancillary offences can only be tried when the principal act is at 
least attempted.132 This may not be the case in many terrorism financing offences. 
In addition, the offence of conspiracy, that deals with planning and preparation, often 
necessitates that more than one actor be involved. However, modern day technology 
allows one lone individual to finance terrorism.133  
These scenarios demonstrate the importance of such a Convention. It allows for the 
discovery of the planning or preparation of large-scale terrorist acts and cuts off the 
organization behind them.  
 
Koh provides another argument for adoption of the Financing Convention. He suggests 
that terrorist groups that have strong financial infrastructures alter the concept of harm. 
These groups, such as Al-Qaeda, can develop harm from being sporadic and local to being 
continuous and broad. Strong financing can develop an organization’s influence and 
expand its scope of activities.134 The development of a Convention to deal with such 
offences is therefore considered an international accomplishment and strong addition to the 
Universal Legal Framework.  
 
Following elaboration by the Ad Hoc Committee, the Working Group of the General 
Assemblies Sixth Committee was given the draft to further elaborate in late September 
1999. After further negotiations, a final text was presented, which was recommended for 
adoption by the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. 
This text of the Convention was initially rejected by Cuba, Lebanon, Libya and Syria. 
These delegates believed that the Convention should define terrorism in all its forms and 
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manifestations and it should not be adopted until there was general agreement on that 
issue.135  As a compromise, the Chairman allowed the Working Group to submit the draft 
Convention to the Sixth Committee not for adoption but for further discussion and 
consideration. It was therefore submitted as part of the Working Group’s report. 136 
The Ad Hoc Committee chairman introduced the report at the Sixth Committee’s annual 
debate on international terrorism. He suggested that the Financing Convention had been 
supported by most delegations and that it should be adopted, stating that the text should not 
be reopened for further deliberation since it ‘represented a delicate balance of interests.’137 
This kind of compromise has not been seen within the current Comprehensive Convention 
negotiations. A number of delegations such as the European Union and the Rio Group 
supported such an adoption.138 The United States even deemed its drafting as 
‘excellent’.139 
There were still however reservations, especially by the Syrian and Lebanese delegations, 
who wished for the Convention to go further in its definition of the offence.140 In bilateral 
discussions with these delegates a compromise was agreed upon. This resulted in a strong 
restatement of the Right to Self-Determination being included in the preamble of the draft 
Resolution, which would supplement the Convention. This was in the form of a cross-
reference to the 1991 General Assembly Resolution on Terrorism, a Resolution that had 
been adopted by consensus.141 These two States were moderately happy with this result, 
and the Sixth Committee was then able to adopt the Financing Convention without a vote 
and submit it to the plenary of the General Assembly for final approval.142 The plenary 
adopted the instrument on the 9th December 1999, through Resolution 54/109, and 
requested that the Secretary General open the Convention for signature.143  
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The negotiations of the Convention were deemed to be relatively successful. It took only 
16 months from the first introduction of the draft by the French delegation for the 
Convention to be adopted by the General Assembly. This is remarkable compared to the 
seven years it had taken the same Ad Hoc Committee to create the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention adopted in 2005. 
 
During this drafting time the Security Council was also actively engaging in countering 
financing of terrorism activities and in October 1999 it adopted Resolution 1267. This, as 
described in the previous Chapter, was directed against the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s actions 
in Afghanistan. It included many financial sanctions aimed at these organizations. It set the 
stage for having targeted financial sanctions as a way of dealing with international 
terrorism and paved the way for the adoption of the Financing Convention two months 
later, which was able to add further clarity to this sanction regime.144 
 
The Convention however, despite the increased international support for counter terrorist 
financing actions, was slow to enter into force. This is the burden of all Universal 
Framework Conventions due to their controversial nature. The Financing Convention did 
not do so until 10th April 2002.145  
3.2 September 11th 2001 and the Convention. 
 
The entry into force of the Financing Convention was influenced substantially by the 
international surge in counter terrorism efforts following the attacks of September 11th 
2001. Before this, from 1999 to 2001, only Botswana, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom and 
Uzbekistan had ratified the Convention.146 This is despite it being drafted with relative 
ease. Now in 2014, 15 years later, it is the most ratified counter terrorism convention, 
within the Universal Framework, having 185 parties, this is in part due to the issue of 
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terrorist financing and the Financing Convention itself being of particular importance in 
post September 11 rhetoric.147  
 
The previous Chapter highlighted the importance of Security Council Resolution 1373 in 
the development of United Nations counter terrorism policy. This Resolution encouraged 
States to ratify all of the Universal Framework Conventions, but singled out the Financing 
Convention and financing in general as a particular focus of international actions.  
The text of the Resolution mirrors many of the specific requirements within the Financing 
Convention but is binding on all United Nations Member States.  
The Resolution however, as opposed to the Convention, represents a quick immediate 
attempt to respond to international terrorism. It requires States to freeze without delay 
funds and other financial assets or economic resources of suspected terrorists. It does not 
however seek to establish strong domestic structures to do so. It also delves into the wider 
aspects of terrorist financing such as its links with organised criminal groups.148 The 
Financing Convention provides a more long-term solution with many much needed 
definitions and clarifications. This may explain its increase in popularity, with States 
looking to its provisions for more guidance on what the Resolution’s implementation 
entailed.  
 
The increase in ratification of the Convention was not necessarily solely due to Resolution 
1373. The September 11th attacks led to an increase in international awareness and 
willingness to deal with counter terrorism issues. This resulted in a substantial growth in 
technical assistance measures, especially in regards to counter terrorist financing. The G8, 
for example, funded much of the United Nation’s technical and financial aid in the area.149 
The Security Council also engaged organizations to cooperate in bilateral and multilateral 
aid and assistance in order to achieve the new ambitious counter terrorism objectives.150 
Resolution 1373 itself established the CTC, which, as outlined above, is a permanent body 
that ensures compliance with the Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Resolutions.  
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The CTC prioritises Counter Terrorism Financing measures when reviewing State’s 
implementation reports. It is found within Stage A of the reviewing process when 
considerations are made on the developing State’s executive machinery. All other counter 
terrorism considerations are found within the Stage B.151 This demonstrates that 
establishing financial processes provided for by the Convention is a key priority.  
The Financing Convention also finds support through the Financial Action Task Force 
[hereafter FATF] Special Recommendations. These comprise 40 recommendations on 
money laundering and nine on terrorist financing that have been developed by the FATF. 
The first eight recommendations on terrorist financing were added in October 2001, shortly 
after the September 11 attacks and a ninth was added in 2004. The first of these 
recommendations advises States to adopt and implement the Financing Convention and the 
United Nation’s financing Resolutions.152 The further recommendations cover the offences 
that are criminalised in the Financing Convention itself.  
The FATF in addition to making such recommendations conducts evaluations in order to 
ensure their members are following the outlined guidelines. States that are not in 
compliance with such measures are put on a non-compliance list and required to make the 
necessary changes. These are an excellent way to ensure and monitor the compliance of 
States with the Financing Convention and its definition of terrorism.153  
 
The actions of the United Nations, post September 11, had a great influence on the counter 
terrorist financing movement especially with Resolution 1373 obligating reluctant States to 
take on financial controls without their consent. The provisions of the Financing 
Convention were used by States to add much needed clarity to the legally binding elements 
within the Resolution, including the elements of a definition of an act of terrorism.  
Since this growth in ratification there have been approximately $147 million in assets 
frozen and many countries have legislated to freeze assets associated with Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban, with 170 Member States passing legislation against the financing of terrorist 
groups in general.154  
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The above sections have outlined the negotiation process of the Financing Convention by 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism and have importantly drawn attention to the effect 
that September 11th has had upon its adoption. This has also led to a number of strong 
technical assistance mechanisms prioritising its proper implementation.  
The above sections aim to demonstrate the strength of the Convention as an instrument that 
adds clarity to State’s international obligations. The international support the Convention 
attracts is also significant as this Convention includes the only international definition of 
terrorism currently in force, and this thesis aims to suggest that this definition has the 
potential to have a wider scope of applicability. It would not be as successful in this 
respect, if the Convention as a whole did not have such strong international support.  
3.3 Specialised provisions 
 
This section will examine and analyze in more detail some of the unique provisions 
included within the Financing Convention. It seeks to provide a general overview of the 
Convention articles and why its adoption is important to the countering terrorist financing 
movement and to the United Nations counter terrorism policy as a whole. The aim of this 
analysis is to provide context to the detailed discussion in the next Chapter on the 
definition of terrorism, found within Article 2(1) of the Financing Convention. This section 
will examine how this definition is applied within the context of financing of terrorism. 
 
The Convention is built, like the other Universal Framework Conventions, upon a common 
structure, which as outlined in the previous chapter includes measures that facilitate 
international cooperation such as mutual legal assistance and the requirement to extradite 
or prosecute. To supplement this, each Convention then has its own specialized provisions, 
unique to their subject matter. The Financing Convention includes different provisions that 
aim to outlaw the financing of terrorism.   
 
The Convention stands out from the rest of the Universal Framework as it targets an 
intangible process rather than a physical act committed by an individual or a group of 
individuals. The movement of finances, in the modern day, is most likely carried out 
through the electronic services of banks and trusts. Therefore, the drafters of the 
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Convention had to target these legal entities and regulate their actions, in order to 
effectively eradicate the financing of terrorism.155 
 
Article 1, is the first article of particular importance to this discussion. This provides 
various definitions important to the Convention including the definition of funds, provided 
in Article 1(1).  
This outlines that funds are ‘assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable 
or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, 
including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but 
not limited to, bank credits, travelers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, 
securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.’156   
This definition is very comprehensive and stretches far beyond ‘funds’ common dictionary 
meaning. The Convention’s definition would allow for many different items to be covered 
including buildings or even animals.157 Therefore, individuals who, for example, provide a 
car to be used in a terrorist car bombing, can be found guilty of two separate universal 
framework offences. They could firstly be liable as an ancillary under the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention, but also, as a primary actor under the Financing Convention’s 
definition of funds. The only objects that could plausibly not be considered a fund would 
be one with little or no monetary value.158 It is unlikely however that terrorist groups 
would have use for any such item.  
The drafters may have chosen such a wide definition, in order to allow for the many 
multifaceted elements of terrorism operations, allowing for training and infrastructure 
provisions such as food and shelter as well as more obvious items to fall within the scope 
of the convention.159 
Article 8 then supports this definition of funds. It requires the identification, detection and 
freezing or seizure of any of these funds and the forfeiture of any proceeds derived from 
them.160 This includes a caveat in Article 8(5) that states that this article will be 
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implemented without prejudice to the rights of third parties who are acting in good faith. 
Therefore if such money is transferred to an innocent party without their knowledge, they 
will not be subject to forfeiture.161 It is also provided that, subject to domestic 
considerations, such forfeitures should be used to benefit those who are victims of 
terrorism. This reflects the victim-orientated outlook of the Universal Legal Framework 
Against Terrorism and the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.162  
 
This definition of funds covers a wide range of activities. It was therefore important that 
the Ad Hoc Committee drafted a definition of terrorism for use within this Convention. It 
is able to designate when such funds are terrorist and therefore considered to be used for 
illegal purposes. If no such definition was drafted, there would be a significant lack of 
clarity as to when such activities could be legitimately prosecuted, with much being left to 
domestic interpretations.  
 
Following on from this, Article 2 provides for the definition of the offence of financing of 
terrorism, this is the backbone of the Convention. It states that: 
 
‘1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by 
any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with 
the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full 
or in part, in order to carry out: 
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the 
treaties listed in the annex; or 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act.’ 163 
 
Article 2(1) (a) and (b) is of particular note to this thesis and will be considered in more 
detail in following Chapter. It represents the only definition of terrorism to be agreed upon 
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internationally. This section however first focuses on the other elements of Article 2, 
primarily paragraph one. This provides the context for the current application of the 
definition and will provide more detail on the primary offence of the Financing 
Convention.  
 
The offence of terrorist financing within paragraph one of Article 2 can be split into two 
distinct parts. The first is the physical offence, that is the providing or collecting of funds. 
These constitute two separate offences. An individual can both collect the funds and then 
provide the funds to the terrorist groups and be guilty successively of both or simply of 
one.164  
This is then followed by the Mens Rea element of each offence, that there is intention or 
knowledge that such funds will be used for terrorist purposes. The difference between the 
knowledge and intention variable is however small. Intention demonstrates a desire that 
funds will be used whereas knowledge demonstrates some level of certainty. However, 
when dealing with such organizations a high level of certainty is unlikely. 165 
 
The definition of financing of terrorism also includes the term ‘unlawfully’ in order to 
designate those types of actions that will constitute the offence. This did not appear in the 
original draft presented by France. It is likely that it was introduced in order to counter the 
concerns of humanitarian and charitable organizations. During the drafting process, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the 
Red Cross, along with a number of other humanitarian organizations, raised concerns that 
their assistance may result in prosecution under the definition of financing of terrorism.166 
They stated that a wide definition would impede the good work of aid workers during 
armed conflicts. They admitted that during such situations, funds were distributed to 
thousands of individuals, and as a result some of this assistance may end up in the hands of 
organized criminal groups including terrorists. They stated that it would be impossible for 
such an organization to carry out assistance without this inevitable consequence and it was 
deemed as a necessary evil.167 They proposed the inclusion of a disclaimer to cover 
                                                
164 Lavalle, R. (2000). The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Max-
Planck-institut , 491- 510. At pg. 498 
165 ibid  
166 Comments by the UNHCR, UN Doc A/C.6/54/WGI/INF/1 and by ICRC at UN DOC. 
A/AC.252/1999/INF/2.  
167 Lehto, M. (2009). Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts: Redefintion of the Concept of Terrorism 
Beyond Violent Acts. Lieden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers . At Chapter 6 pg 272 
 44 
humanitarian purposes within the Convention. The disclaimer was rejected during the 
negotiations. As a compromise the definition within Article 2 was made more general and 
given stronger threshold, so that humanitarian activities could be excluded from the net. 
This included the requirements that funds be ‘unlawful’.168  The inclusion of this word 
however could also lead to diversity in national application, depending on each State’s 
interpretation of the word ‘unlawful’. National courts may be able to use it in the acquittal 
of individuals financing terrorism. 
 
The offence of terrorist financing, also poses a general problem, in that it is essentially 
victimless. Aust points out that due to this it is almost impossible that a sum of money used 
to finance a particular attack, could be proved, with a high degree of certainty, to be 
intended for that particular purpose.169 Therefore, in order to counter this consideration, 
Article 2(3) outlines that ‘for an act to constitute an offence... it shall not be necessary that 
the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1.’170  
It is also important to note in this regard that a terrorist attack is in general not very costly. 
It is estimated that the large scale September 11th attacks cost only $500,000. This 
included allowing 19 terrorists to train as commercial pilots, enter and exit the United 
States numerous times and live adequately for months. Any contribution to this small 
amount of financing still supports the terrorist’s final aim and so it was necessary that this 
provision of the Convention cover such an occurrence.171 This discussion demonstrates the 
importance of the Mens Rea element to the offence. It allows for legal purchases to be 
designated as unlawful due to the individual’s intention for their use.  
 
The result of the specificity of such provisions means that the Convention needs direct 
action for implementation by domestic authorities. It is unlikely that under domestic 
criminal law, such victimless action would already constitute a general offence.  
The Financing Convention is unique in that it keeps terrorism as a core element in all 
provisions; it is therefore essential that it includes a definition of such an act. This is the 
opposite of many of the other Universal Legal Framework Conventions that are able to slot 
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easily into existing domestic provisions. These other Conventions are also able to cover 
incidents without terrorist elements. An individual may, for example, bomb a plane in 
order to gain a life insurance policy, and be prosecuted under the Aviation Convention 
provisions, even though they lack requisite terrorist intent. 172  
 
This demonstrates the importance of the Financing Convention having a definition of 
terrorism, to ensure that the intended use for such funds is terrorist in nature. The 
Financing Convention therefore requires a very active implementation process by domestic 
legal systems. The consultation and development of such processes may be costly and 
difficult for certain States to achieve.  
 
Other than the criminalization of the financing of terrorism itself, the Convention also 
includes a number of other important aspects, essential to its operation.  
First, in order to criminalize the financing of terrorism, it is important that the Convention 
is able to criminalize the actions of legal entities. The Convention aims to make banks and 
trusts aware that their active involvement, or the knowledge of actions by their senior 
personnel, will result in the organizations vicarious liability.173  
This is dealt with through Article 5 (1) of the Convention. It states that ‘Each State Party, 
in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary measures to 
enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable 
when a person responsible for the management or control of that entity has, in that 
capacity, committed an offence set forth in Article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil 
or administrative.’174  
Most of the other Universal Framework Conventions do not have such provisions, as acts 
are of a tangible nature, committed by individuals and not entities. Under the Financing 
Convention it is not necessary that the entity should have benefited from the transaction, 
but a senior employee must commit the offence. This employee will only become liable if 
the offence is carried out in an official capacity.175 The establishment of this is not an easy 
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task but for example, it can be presumed that if a bank manager is accessing official 
computers to transfer illicit funds to terrorists, they are acting in an official capacity. A 
private individual would not have the access or the knowhow to carry out such a 
transaction.176  
Further to this, it is worthy of note that the article only applies to legal entities located 
within the particular State’s territory. This suggests that one State would not be able to 
hold another liable for committing this offence. This raises a number of implications with 
regards to embassies and governmental offices located in Member States and the legality 
of their financial transactions.177  
This article is also supported by Article 12 that prevents such legal entities from hiding 
behind the rules of bank secrecy. In addition Article 13 protects the international 
cooperation mechanisms of mutual legal assistance and extradition by preventing the 
offence of terrorist financing from being designated as a fiscal offence.178  
However, like most other provisions the article includes a caveat in order to protect state 
sovereignty. It provides States with discretion as to its application within domestic law. At 
present not all States have integrated systems in order to deal with vicarious liability or 
they are in a period of development.179 This leads to diversity in application of a provision 
at the heart of the Financing Convention operation.180  
 
This section has attempted to provide a general overview of a number of the important 
provisions included within the Financing Convention. It highlights how the Convention 
has grown to become the first to truly deal with international terrorism as a core element, 
requiring a number of important changes to national legal systems. This also demonstrates 
why it is the only international counter terrorism convention currently in force that 
includes a definition of international terrorism and how such a definition was so easily 
drafted. 
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The Financing Convention has created innovative provisions, stretching international 
counter terrorism initiatives to cover intangible acts and legal entities such as banks. Its 
definition of terrorism has been tailored to add clarity to such unique provisions.  
The next Chapter will outline the various elements of this definition in a more detailed 
manner, looking in particular at whether this financing context affects its ability to be 
treated as a general pragmatic definition of terrorism.  
3.4. Conclusions 
 
To conclude; overall this chapter has sought to develop a background to the final Chapter’s 
discussion on the Conventions definition of terrorism. It has also attempted to demonstrate 
the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism as a centerpiece of the Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism. It 
represents a strong and innovative approach by the United Nations General Assembly and 
filled an important gap in its counter terrorism policy.  
Its negotiations represent a successful and succinct discussion that demonstrates that 
innovative Conventions can be developed within the space of a year. The Convention, 
despite its demanding provisions, holds the highest ratification rate within the Framework. 
Its provisions are costly to implement but the Convention has the benefit of being 
supported by a number of technical assistance and implementation programs that ensure 
that all national legal systems combat the financing of terrorism in cooperation with one 
another and have the resources and knowledge to do so. It was important to this thesis’ 
main claim that the current Chapter demonstrated the specific and unique context in which 
the definition of terrorism was drafted. This aimed to contribute to the debate on whether 
the Financing Conventions definition can be applied more generally, as a universal 
definition of terrorism.  
The Financing Convention is a strong international effort to eradicate an international 
problem. It was important for this Chapter to establish the strength of the Convention as a 
whole, in order to demonstrate the potential that such a definition can have, in providing 
much needed legitimacy to the United Nations counter terrorism policy. 
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4. A Pragmatic Definition of Terrorism 
 
The thesis will now move on to analyze in detail the definition of terrorism within Article 
2(1) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
1999. This final Chapter will begin by evaluating this definition, examining in detail its 
various objective and subjective elements. This is the core of this thesis’ proposal.  
The second section will then compare the definition, with Europe’s regional definition of 
terrorism, found within the European Council’s Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism. The definition, although regional, was one of the first definitions of terrorism to 
be drafted post September 11th 2001 and provides an example of a general and 
comprehensive definition of terrorism.  
The purpose of such a comparison is to further evaluate the Financing Convention’s 
definition, to both praise and critique. It seeks to prove that the many similarities between 
the definitions, especially in regards to their formulation, supports this thesis’ claim that 
the Financing Conventions definition could be applicable in a more general context, to 
terrorism acts outside of the financing context. 
 
4.1 Analysis of Article 2(1) (a) and (b) 
 
This section will begin by analyzing the objective and subjective elements of the definition 
of terrorism within the Financing Convention. This thesis suggests the application of such 
a definition, as a general definition of terrorism, may pragmatically provide a solution to 
the United Nations Universal Legal Framework’s legitimacy problems.  
The definition states that terrorist financing will occur if an individual collects funds with 
the purposes of committing:   
 
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the 
treaties listed in the annex or; 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any 
other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when 
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the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.181 
 
As highlighted in the previous Chapter, it was necessary that such a definition be included 
within the Financing Convention due to the nature of the Convention itself. It is 
inconceivable that an offence of terrorist financing could have been developed without a 
conception of what acts are being financed or what intention the financers have. Terrorism 
was for the first time an essential element within an international convention and so had to 
be defined adequately.  
It was thought that the drafting of such a definition would be arduous and may halt the 
development of the Financing Convention completely.182 However, this was not the case; 
the article was negotiated with relative ease. This is a huge triumph in the development of 
the United Nations counter terrorism policy, especially since the same Ad Hoc Committee 
has been in session, at the time of writing, for 14 years discussing such a definition within 
a Comprehensive Convention context.  
The next paragraphs will therefore examine in more detail the article and its various 
important aspects.  
4.1.1 The Annex 
 
Article 2 (1)(a) begins with reference to the Financing Conventions Annex.183 
The Convention’s Annex includes a list of the nine international counter terrorism treaties 
that had been developed since the 1970’s by the United Nations. This list today has been 
consolidated within the Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism, something that has 
been discussed in depth within Chapter 1.  
The offences that are included in the Conventions cover crimes against civil aviation, 
diplomatic agents, the taking of hostages, nuclear related offences and maritime offices. It 
also includes the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 
that was developed by the Ad Hoc Committee prior to its drafting of the Terrorist 
Financing Convention. The drafters wished to limit the Conventions within the Annex to 
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those with criminal implications. As a result it does not include the Convention on 
Offences and Other Acts Committed on Board of Aircraft 1963, as it was thought that it 
did not meet this particular purpose.184   
 
The definition is not limited to the primary offences within these Conventions; it also 
embraces ancillary offences such as aiding and abetting. 
During drafting, some delegations expressed concern that this may lead to long chains of 
participation with individuals being charged with a number of different offences that all 
contributed to the final attack.  
This concern did not prevent its eventual inclusion, as delegations were extremely wary of 
creating a definition with loopholes.185 They foresaw a situation arising where an 
individual, depending upon the State they were in, being absolved of guilt, despite being 
heavily involved within the planning process of a terrorist attack. This would allow them to 
continue such activities and would not prevent future acts. 186 Therefore the provision 
regarding ancillary offences forms a part of the definition.  
 
The use of this Annex within the definition is important as it allows for recognition of the 
previous efforts of United Nations Member States in drafting the mentioned Conventions. 
It provides clarity as to what each offence entails and also ensures States are clear on what 
offences can constitute a terrorist act. 
Dugard states that ‘It is difficult to imagine a form of terrorism not covered by these 
Conventions.187 
The lack of clarity regarding offences was one of the failings of the League of Nations 
definition of terrorism, outlined in Chapter 1. This definition stated that terrorism includes 
‘all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of 
terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public’188. 
This does little to provide guidance as to what criminal acts it intends to cover. The 
reference to the Annex provides the much needed guidance required. 
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Additionally, drafters discussed whether the Annex should be open or closed. As outlined 
in the previous chapters, United Nations counter terrorism policy is extremely fluid and the 
Universal Legal Framework is often developed as and when the need for new Conventions 
arises. Since the Financing Conventions inception, three new Counter Terrorism 
Conventions have been created, all dealing with different areas and offences. 
Any strong definition of terrorism, if it wished to fit within the current Framework, would 
need to be able to keep up with such development. It was therefore decided that the Annex 
should be open.189 This provision is found within Article 23 of the Financing 
Convention.190 This allows for the Annex to be amended. Only treaties that are open to the 
participation of all States, which have entered into force and have been ratified by at least 
22 parties of the Financing Convention, can be included within the Annex. Currently, none 
of the later counter terrorism Conventions have met these requirements. 
 
The Annex is an important part of this definition. It allows for inclusion of different State 
perspectives. States, who favour the sectoral approach, are able to continue the piecemeal 
development of treaties, but those who wish for a freestanding definition are also taken 
into account in the articles further paragraphs. 
 
There are however some downfalls to this approach. First, the Conventions found within 
the Annex are not universally ratified or implemented by all United Nations Member 
States. The Universal Framework Conventions tend to have low ratification rates due to 
their controversial nature. A surge was seen post September 11, but despite this there 
acceptance is by no means universal. States therefore are able to label different offences as 
‘terrorist’ depending upon the Conventions they have adopted.191   
It was discussed during drafting whether ratifications of the Universal Framework 
instruments should be made compulsory. However, many States were concerned that the 
adoption of such a definition would bring them much wider obligations than they first 
                                                
189 Aust, A. (2001). Counter-Terrorism - A New Approach: The International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law , 5, 285-306. At pg 299 
190 United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism,” 9 December 1999, No. 38349 Article 23 
191 Phillips, A. (2004). Terrorist Financing Laws Wont Wash: It aint Money Laundering. University of 
Queensland Law Journal , 23, 81-103. At pg 87 
 52 
envisaged. This issue was therefore likely to impede the Conventions development, so 
such a provision was left out.192  
Additionally, in order to protect State sovereignty, Article 2(2) gives States the ability to 
make declarations pertaining to the application of the Conventions within the Annex that it 
is not a party to. Therefore one State may declare it will not apply the offences within the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention. Such a declaration will cease if the State then chooses to 
join the Convention in question. The same is said if a State decides to leave a Convention. 
States are therefore given complete freedom to be bound by what they wish193and in 
consequence, as to what offences they deem as terrorist.  
On the other hand, the Annex may also have a positive impact upon the development of 
United Nations counter terrorism policy. It may encourage newly participating States to 
ratify the instruments, therefore decreasing loopholes in its implementation.194  
The inclusion of the Annex however, further complicates the task of monitoring the 
application of the Universal Frameworks’ already vast array of Conventions. The 
inclusions of both the Annex and its very open nature, results in the need for the 
monitoring of both the State’s implementation of the offences but also of their position in 
regards to the definition. Monitoring effectively is made almost impossible, especially 
since the CTC and other monitoring bodies are already at capacity.195  
Therefore Article 2(1)(a) and the Annex, have both positive and negative aspects. 
However, its inclusion is able to provide States with the domestic freedoms they need and 
is able to recognise and pay tribute to the past work of the United Nations in the creation of 
these instruments.  
The Annex itself however cannot exist alone as it contains a number of gaps when it comes 
to possible offences. The Conventions do not cover common criminal acts against the 
person. Murder for terrorist purposes is for example, only covered if the victim is 
murdered as a result of a terrorist bombing or is either a diplomat or an international 
protected person. 
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4.1.2 The Mini-Definition of Terrorism 
 
Article 2(1)(b) supplements the Annex.196 This is considered to be a mini-definition of 
terrorism, expanding on the offences in the Annex. It covers both additional acts of 
terrorism and the Mens Rea element. 
The article begins by allowing for the acts that are missing from the Annex. It states that 
terrorism will cover ‘any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian.’ This allows for the offences, such as murder, which are not included within the 
Annex to be covered by the Convention.197  
The formulation of this part of the section is wide and able to cover many different crimes. 
It was drafted in this way in order to enable the Convention to deal with unforeseeable 
future events. International Terrorism is constantly developing; today for example, cyber 
terrorism is an increasing risk and burden to deal with by the international community. The 
wording of this definition allows for its inclusion.198   
 
It is important to note that it also sets a level of violence required. That is for such violence 
to be ‘serious’. Some regional conventions, such as the Arab Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism have been criticized for lacking such an element.199 This 
inclusion is able to elevate terrorism to be a crime with significant harm.  
The paragraph then follows with a caveat on its application. This is that the offence will 
not cover those taking ‘an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.’ This is 
due to International Humanitarian Law already adequately covering this area. For example, 
Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention200 prohibits ‘all measures…of terrorism’ 
against civilians. These acts are also prohibited if carried out by civilians themselves or by 
organized groups in a conflict or occupied territory.201 The Geneva Conventions however 
only apply to States during international and non-international armed conflicts and there is 
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much discussion of their applicability to individual citizen’s offences. The case of Galić202 
in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia suggests that such a 
criminalization exists. It is of note that terrorism is not included in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, in part due to its lack of definition. Cassese states however 
that enough support of this element can be found within a number of normative 
developments, including in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This, he suggests, demonstrates such individual 
acts can amount to war crimes. He also highlights that as States could agree upon its 
inclusion within the Financing Conventions definition, it can exist as an individual crime 
within international law more generally.203 
 
The armed forces caveat itself includes two different elements. That is that the act exempt 
from the definition must occur during an armed conflict but also that such participation 
within the conflict should be active. If both elements are met the result is clear, the acts 
would not be considered as terrorism to be dealt with under the Convention. However, a 
situation could exist where just one element is covered. A terrorist act could be carried out 
during a situation of armed conflict but not by an individual participating directly. For 
example, attacks by or on off-duty members of the armed forces.204 These therefore would 
be included for the purposes of this definition. The benefit of having these two elements is 
that there are limited situations where civilians are not protected. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross petitioned during the negotiations for such an inclusion.205  
This exclusion was drafted with relative ease, despite it causing a standstill in current 
Comprehensive Convention negotiations. 
Therefore, it is important to note in this respect that the context in which negotiations were 
based is different for this Convention. Within terrorism financing the exemption of the 
armed forces is a less pressing discussion. International law clearly recognizes that armies 
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are entitled to kill, but also recognizes that this does not allow them the right to finance 
others to kill.206 
 
The Convention does not focus in detail upon these objective elements outlined above. 
This reflects how some of the national definitions of terrorism have been developed. For 
example, in the Netherlands no such element is needed as terrorism can be prosecuted 
subjectively based upon the Mens Rea alone. This raises a number of issues and Van 
Sliedregt notes that such an idea may not be in compliance with the important principle of 
the presumption of innocence.207  
 
Following this the article then moves on to the Mens Rea elements of the definition. It 
states that the purposes of an act should be taken from its ‘nature or context’. This creates 
an objective standard for determining such intention. In most terrorist attacks it is clear 
what its purpose is. However, in some cases such nature is not indicated. Therefore the 
following paragraph moves on to providing a clear annunciation of such a purpose that a 
terrorist act must hold. That is to ‘intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.’  
This element of the definition is important, as it is able to separate terrorist acts from other 
types of violent international crime. 
Cassese points out that  
‘A terrorist act, for instance blowing up a disco, may surely be performed by a single 
individual not belonging to any group or organization. However, the act is terrorist if the 
agent was moved by a collective set of ideas or tenets (a political platform, an ideology or 
a body of religious principles), thereby subjectively identifying himself with a group or 
organization intent on taking similar actions. It is this factor that transforms the murderous 
action of an individual into a terrorist act.’208 
 
The definition mentions no further levels of intention and so it is confined to this scope. 
It however, sets a particularly wide conception of this intention. It would not be difficult 
for a court, if personal intent could not clearly be inferred from the acts circumstances, to 
                                                
206 Diaz-Paniagua, C. F. (2008). Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-
Terrorism Treaties 1997-2005. City University of New York , 1-804. At pg 468 
207 Sliedregt, E. V. (2010). European Approaches to Fighting Terrorism. Duke Journal of Comparitive and 
international law , 20 (413), 424-26. 
208 Cassese, A. (2006). The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice , 4, 933-958. At 937 
 56 
instead infer that the individual was committing a bombing with the intent of intimidating 
a population or compelling a government.209 It allows for ease of prosecution, as many 
beliefs are able to fit within this broad framework.  
This also demonstrates however why having a more limited range of applicable acts is 
important, as a wider view may allow for numerous different acts being designated as 
terrorist, including the acts of protestors.  
The above discussion has outlined the main objective and subjective elements of the 
definition of terrorism contained with Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Financing Convention.  
4.1.3 Supplementary issues 
 
In addition, it is of note that this definition does not directly outline who the perpetrator of 
such an attack could be. It is therefore possible that it could apply to any individual, non-
State actors or groups and even States.210 The past UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism 
and Human Rights notes that there is a degree of consensus that a definition of terrorism 
not extend to the thorny issue of who can be a potential author of terrorism.211 In the Ad 
Hoc Committee discussions this has been the source of some controversy, particularly in 
regards to State sponsored terrorism. The delegation of Nicaragua, forming part of the 
Non-Aligned movement, stated in 2013 that such State terrorism was abominable yet it 
continued to enjoy international impunity.212  
 
It is also worth consideration, that one of the central problems to the creation of a 
definition of terrorism, was its implications upon the Right to Self-Determination and 
whether actions taken during legitimate liberation movements should be considered within 
any definitions scope. There is little reference directly to Self-Determination within the 
Financing Convention’s definition of terrorism, aside from its requirement that conduct be 
unlawful. The Convention does however, under Article 21, state that ‘nothing in this 
Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and 
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individuals under international law, in particular the purposes of the Charter of the United 
Nations, International Humanitarian law and other relevant Conventions.’213 This is an 
element also found within the common framework of the Universal Framework 
Conventions. This is significant as it in effect preserves the Right to Self-Determination 
but is not a direct reference within the definition itself. The Convention’s attached 
Resolution also makes reference to Self Determination.  
Such liberation movements may also be considered under the Armed Conflict caveat, in 
order to ensure the rights protection. In International Humanitarian law, armed conflicts 
can be classified both as international and non-international. Non-international may be able 
to cover this action. To support this view, it is interesting to note that the United States 
included in its ratification instruments a statement that provides that the term ‘armed 
conflict’ does not include international disturbances and tensions.214  
Despite this dichotomy being a major obstacle in the development of a definition during 
the Ad Hoc Committees negotiations of a Comprehensive Convention, during the 
Financing Conventions negotiations the only State to raise a substantial objection was 
Syria. Despite this, the Financing Convention was still able to enter into force with no 
reservations that substantially affect the definitions operation. Some States reiterate their 
support for the Right to Self-Determination and extend the definitions application to 
foreign resistance movements within reservations to the Convention. 215 This type of 
reservation is however common in such instruments and allows for the definition to be 
tailored to a State’s domestic preferences.  
The adoption of the definition, if anything, demonstrates some international progress. It 
highlights that the presence of Self-Determination need not always dominate the 
negotiation process and that agreement is possible under less politically charged 
circumstances.  
In the recent Ad Hoc Committee discussion in 2013, the delegation from the European 
Union, called upon all States involved in the discussions to ratify and implement without 
delay all of the existing international Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism. This is 
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significant as it further demonstrates the international support that such a framework and 
the definition it possesses. 216 
4.1.4. Conclusions 
 
In summary, this section of the Chapter has outlined the object and subjective elements of 
Article 2(1) (a) and (b) of the Financing Convention. This discussion has attempted to 
demonstrate that the definition represents a viable option to provide guidance to States on 
how an international definition of terrorism is formulated. It outlines which acts can be 
considered terrorist for the purposes of the definition, including each offences necessary 
elements.  
 
It is still important to note however that, as Norberg217 points out, this high ratification rate 
does not necessarily demonstrate full international acceptance of the Financing 
Convention. The surge in ratification occurred, as outlined in the previous Chapter, as a 
result of the shock of the attacks of September 11th and due to States being legally required 
to take such action through Security Council Resolution 1373. The motives of States are 
therefore not necessarily crystal clear.  
States may also find such a definition acceptable simply due to the context in which it 
appears. It was necessary that the Financing Convention included such a definition and so 
States were therefore able to negotiate one. However, in the drafting of the Comprehensive 
Convention, States are pursuing wider, more political aims and so distancing themselves 
with the previous drafting successes of the other counter terrorism instruments. The 
delegation of Lebanon demonstrated this by emphasizing, during a Sixth Committee 
discussion, that the current negotiations were the appropriate place to solve issues that had 
not been dealt with during the creation of the Universal Framework Conventions, therefore 
including during the drafting of the Financing Conventions definition.218  
Thus a States interest can differ considerably upon context.  
In addition, the definition discussed within this Chapter comes from a specific counter 
terrorism financing context. This, as the previous Chapter outlines, effects how the 
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definition was drafted. The Mens Rea element of the offence, for example, is more 
prominent, due to the importance of identifying whether a particular financial transaction is 
legitimate or unlawful. The definition has additionally been given a wider draft to allow for 
humanitarian organizations to be able to continue providing financial aid.  
These considerations are very specific to its current context and have influenced the way 
the definition has been drafted, possibly affecting its applicability to a more general 
context. 
The definition would also need to be applied to physical acts of terrorism such as terrorist 
bombing. Therefore some loopholes may arise during the definition’s interpretation, as it 
was not drafted with such acts in mind.  The other Universal Framework Conventions are 
also able to cover incidents without terrorist elements. The Financing Convention is unable 
to do so, with terrorism being an element core to its application.  
The use of this definition within the wider context may therefore narrow other counter 
terrorism Conventions and hinder their use and the ease in which they fit into national 
laws. The downside of this is that it may require further costly and time-consuming 
national implementation processes. 
This demonstrates further the specificity of the context and its effect upon the definition’s 
ability to be applied more generally. However, despite this, the definition is still a 
pragmatic way forward as an example of a working definition of international terrorism 
that contains all of the necessary elements to be applied more generally.  
Furthermore, the Conventions within the Universal Framework are certainly, to some 
extent norm creating, in particular the provisions of the Financing Convention. It has a 
high ratification rate and is supported by a number of technical assistance programs, which 
prioritize its proper implementation. This thesis does not however intend to suggest that 
such a Convention or its definition has been elevated to the status of customary 
international law. The Universal Framework Conventions do demonstrate the willingness 
of States to rapidly assume new counter terrorism obligations. Young219 suggests that the 
momentum and success that United Nations counter terrorism policy has attracted could 
even amount to some State practice and emerging opinio juris. The level of disagreement 
however on a number of elements of such a definition and the high level of State practice 
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Comparative Law Review , 29, 23. At pg 65 
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required, makes it unlikely that customary international law would be achieved, at least in 
the foreseeable future.  
This does not however mean that this development doesn’t form an essential and unique 
part of the Universal Framework. It still should hold a strong position within the 
Framework and includes a number of positive qualities that can provide important 
guidance to States.  The more acceptance the definition achieves internationally, the more 
potential it has to reach customary international law status.  
 
The next section of this Chapter will move on to discuss this definition further through a 
comparison with the regional definition of terrorism in Europe.  
4.2 Comparison: What has Europe added? 
 
The previous section has proposed that the United Nations Financing Convention’s 
definition of terrorism under Article 2 (1) (a) and (b) is able to provide States with some 
clarity as to the composition of an international definition of terrorism.  
The current section will now seek to further support this claim, by comparing the above 
mentioned definition with the European Union’s regional definition of terrorism found 
within the European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 13th June 
2002.220 This definition of terrorism provides an example of a general definition of 
terrorism, not limited to the financing context. Therefore the discussion seeks to compare 
the subjective and objective elements of each definition, seeking to both critique and 
consolidate the Financing Convention’s definition.  
It will additionally outline how each definition deals with the controversies that prevent the 
development of an international definition of terrorism, such as the place of the Right to 
Self-Determination. The aim of such a comparison is to further support the ability of the 
Financing Convention’s definition to be taken out of its current context and applied as a 
general United Nations definition of terrorism.  
The European Union definition was chosen for such a comparison as it is largely 
unaffected by United Nations counter terrorism policy and is one of the first definitions in 
the world to be proposed following the September 11th attacks. It is however, only a 
regional definition of terrorism, geographically limited to the European Member States and 
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therefore it is not able to become a general definition of terrorism internationally, as it was 
drafted within regionally limited circumstances. 
4.2.1 The Framework Decision Definition 
 
A European Council Framework Decision is created according to Article 31(e) of the 
Treaty of the European Union. This provides that such a Decision aims to approximate the 
criminal laws of European Member States. The Framework Decision on the Combating of 
Terrorism was developed in order to create a common definition of terrorism at the 
European Union level and to approximate Member States counter terrorism laws for the 
purposes of the European Arrest Warrant. It provides the first definition of terrorism to be 
developed at the European level. 
The proposal for the Framework Decision was presented for discussion just eight days 
after the September 11th attacks on the 19th September 2001.221 
 
The definition within the Framework Decision is found in Article 1. It is built upon a 
general definition of terrorism that is supplemented by a large list of applicable offences. 
This section will go through the elements of this definition in detail, comparing them to 
those found within the Financing Convention Article 2(1).  
 
The Framework Decision begins in Article 1(1) by stating that ‘each Member State shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points 
(a) to (i), are defined as offences under national law, which given their nature or context, 
may seriously damage a country or an intentional organization…’222 
This starts the definition by outlining two objective elements of a terrorist offence. The 
first is its incrimination under European Union Member States national law.  
The second objective element then provides the context for this offence. It states that such 
an act should seriously damage a country or an international organization. These represent 
the consequences that stem from an act of terrorism. This elevates the seriousness of a 
terrorist act, and sets it apart from other criminal offences. This area of the definition is 
similar to Article 2(1)(b) of the Financing Convention.  
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The next part of the Framework Decision outlines the subjective intent of the action, what 
were the terrorist’s aims. It states that acts must be carried out ‘with the aim of seriously 
intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or International 
Organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or 
destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country or an international organization.’223 
This element closely mirrors the purposes outlined within Article 2(1)(b) of the Financing 
Convention. It however raises the level of intent by including ‘serious’ intimidation and 
‘unduly compelling’. It also adds the additional element of destroying the ‘political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization’. 
The inclusion of this element has been the subject of criticism and creates a wide 
perception of what events could be considered terrorist.224  For example, the riots in Paris 
in 2005 could be considered as an act that intimidated the population and compels the 
government of France to act. They also endangered the structures outlined within the 
article. These however, were not perceived as terrorism either in France or abroad. 225 They 
could however be considered so for the purposes of this definition. This leads to leeway in 
how a State chooses to apply such a definition, dependent on political motives.  
Weigend however, suggests that this paragraph of the Framework Decision instead 
provides a too high threshold for what is considered a terrorist act. He states that all serious 
offences do not necessarily damage a whole country’s structures or even an international 
organization, unless it is the scale of the September 11th attacks, which is unlikely.226 There 
is therefore debate as to the scope of the Framework Decisions definition. It can both be 
considered too narrow and too wide in its application.  
 
In addition, the Framework Decision article is not, within its main text, limited to civilians 
or those who are not actively participating within an armed conflict. This is unlike the 
Financing Convention definition, which provides more clarity as to its scope.227  
                                                
223 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13th June 2002 on Combating terrorism OJ L 164, 
22.6.2002, p 1-20 Article 1 
224 Castale, D. (2008). Institutional and Legal Aspects of EU Counter-Terrorism. In C. o.-D. Terrorism, Legal 
Aspects of Combating Terrorism. Amsterdam: IOS Press. Pg 123 
225 ibid 
226 Weigend, T. (2006). The Universal Terrorist: The International Community Grappling with a Definition. 
Journal of Interantional Criminal Justice , 4, 912-932. At pg 927 
227 Peers, S. (2003). EU Responses to Terrorism. International and Comparative Law Quaterly , 52 (01), 
227-243 . At pg 231 
 63 
The preamble to the Framework Decision however does state that ‘the actions of the armed 
forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties are not governed by this Framework 
Decision.’228 Peers asserts that including such a caveat within the preamble and not the 
main text demonstrates poor drafting technique. It additionally may demonstrate a 
weakness when the definition is being applied, as it may be considered as a contradiction 
to the ordinary meaning of the text; therefore if ever contested its legal effect may be 
questioned.229  
 
The article then moves on to outline a number of acts that could be considered terrorist for 
the purposes of the definition. The Framework Decision is based heavily upon such acts.  
The article lists nine offences that the Council has considered can be ‘terrorist’ for the 
purposes of the definition. These need to be codified within European Union Member 
States law, pursuant to the earlier paragraph.  
The offence within (a) to (i) of the article include many of the offences outlined within the 
Annex of the Financing Convention and the Universal Framework Against Terrorism. 
Many however go further and produce wider affects. In particular this is the case in regards 
to personal scope, especially when prohibiting death and injury and the damage of 
property. They also include very high thresholds for such acts. Demonstrating again the 
importance the Council has placed on terrorism being considered a serious crime. Article 1 
(d), for example, requires ‘extensive destruction to a Government or public facility…likely 
to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.’ This is an element not easily 
met. Pieth suggest however, that its width is a benefit. It allows the Framework Decision to 
more effectively deal with unforeseen future events, especially when compared with the 
narrower Financing Convention.230  
Additionally, it is also worthy to note that the intent element, within the Framework 
Decision, applies to all the offences that it outlaws. This includes those found within the 
Universal Framework Conventions. This is not the case with the Financing Convention 
definition. The offences referred to in the Annex Conventions determine intent subject to 
their own provisions. The only intent provided for directly by the definition itself, applies 
to acts that cause death or serious bodily injury.  
                                                
228 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13th June 2002 on Combating terrorism OJ L 164, 
22.6.2002, p 1-20 preamble 
229 Peers, S. (2003). EU Responses to Terrorism. International and Comparative Law Quaterly , 52 (01), 
227-243 . At pg 234 
230 Pieth, M. (2006). Criminalising the Financing of Terrorism. Journal of International Criminal Justice , 4, 
1074-1086. At pg 1079 
 64 
The Framework Decision therefore provides a universally applicable definition of terrorist 
intent, which application is reliant upon no other Conventions. This however raises a 
number of issues. For example, under the Hijacking Convention, found within the 
Universal Framework, if an individual hijacked an aircraft solely for monetary gain they 
would be guilty of an offence. Therefore they could be included within the Financing 
Convention’s definition of terrorism. However, this action would not necessarily be 
considered as terrorist under the Framework Decisions scope. It would have to be proved 
that such funds would be used for terrorism offences, in order to meet the context 
requirement within the article. The money gained from the hijacking must also be 
demanded from either an international organization or a government. Its applicability is 
questionable if such a claim was instead made from the airline or other private actors.231 
This demonstrates a flaw in the Framework Decisions articles conception. This section of 
the article is therefore both wider in scope but narrower in application.  
 
In order to ensure that such provisions are not interpreted too widely, Article 1(2) of the 
Framework Decision outlines the obligation of European Union Member States in ensuring 
respect for fundamental rights and the fundamental principles found within Article 6 of the 
Treaty on the European Union.232 This prevents its application being extended to effect 
rights such as the freedom of assembly.233 This is similar to the respect for the principles of 
the United Nations found within the Financing Convention, Article 21.  
 
The Framework Decision also does not explicitly refer to the Right to Self-Determination 
within the main text. In a non-binding declaration there is reference to the principle by 
stating that the definition: 
‘Cannot be construed so as to argue that the conduct of those who have acted in the interest 
of preserving or restoring these democratic values, as was notably the case in some 
Member States during the Second World War, could now be considered ‘terrorist’ acts. 
Nor can it be construed so as to incriminate on terrorist grounds persons exercising their 
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legitimate rights to manifest their opinions, even if in the course of the exercise of such 
right they commit offences.’234 
Although this is non-binding it does provide an important distinction between the two 
areas of international law and therefore represents a positive inclusion.235 The Financing 
Convention goes into no such detail.  
An amendment to the Framework Decision in 2008, added to the definition of terrorism, 
further increasing its scope. Article 3 was extended to cover acts including public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence and recruitment and training of terrorism. 
4.2.2 The comparison conclusions  
 
Therefore, the analysis within this section has attempted to compare the elements within 
these two definitions. It demonstrates the different priorities and negotiation outcomes in 
regional and international contexts.  
The two definitions are similar in a number of ways. They both provide related terrorist 
intents and the context in which a terrorist attack is carried out. They additionally are 
similar in the offences that they cover, though the European Council is much wider in its 
application.  
They also differ in a number of substantial ways. The Framework Decision contains a large 
number of acts, which can be considered as terrorist and a wider conception of terrorist 
intent. It also opts for including a number of controversial elements within non-binding 
areas rather than in the main text. Its main contribution however is the light that it sheds 
upon the detail of the dichotomy between terrorism and Self-Determination within its non-
binding declaration.  
In general, the academic community seems divided upon their opinion of the Framework 
Decisions definition. Some authors see it as being narrow and specific.236 It has also 
however been regarded as overly broad237 and vague.238 This uncertainty has also resulted 
in its application beyond a European context being minimal. Its use within the drafting of 
                                                
234 Council of European Union, Outcome of Proceedings, 14845/1/01, Rev.1, 7th December 2001 pg 15  
235 Ginkel, B. T. (2003). The United Nations: Towards a Comprehensive Convention on Combating 
Terrorism. In M. v. Leeuwen, Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and 
Policies . The Hague: Kluwer Law International. At pg 224 
236 See Saul, B. (2003). International Terrorism as a European Crime: The policy rationale for criminalisaton. 
European Journal Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice , 11, 323-349.  
237 See Walter, C. (2003). Defining Terrorism in National and International Law. In W. e. al, Terrorism as a 
Challenge for National and International Law: Security verses Liberty (pp. 23-44). Verlag: Springer  
238 See Duffy, H. (2005). The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 66 
further instruments, including within the Comprehensive Convention’s negotiations has 
also been limited.239  
This comparison overall has sought to demonstrate some of the Financing Convention’s 
failings but also to highlight the success of the international community in drafting such a 
definition. The definition is able to deal effectively with numerous controversial aspects 
and create a more balanced definition of terrorism, which is not stretched too wide in its 
application. It demonstrates a pragmatic, fit for purpose, international compromise, which 
deserves increased praise and consideration within the international arena. The many 
similarities to the European definition, which is applied to all terrorist acts not just 
financing, indicates the Financing Conventions definition’s ability to also be applied 
successfully within this wider context. This thesis proposes that this definition be 
considered as an international definition for the purposes of the Universal Framework 
Against Terrorism and used as such within technical assistance programs. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This thesis has demonstrated a number of the key achievements of the United Nations in 
the field of counter terrorism. Since the September 11th attacks in particular, the world is 
experiencing much greater regional and international cooperation. Capacity building, 
intelligence sharing and best practices have also grown internationally.240 States have put 
aside political differences to progress in these areas. They have recognized, to some extent, 
that international terrorism needs a strong and progressive United Nations policy, such as 
the one outlined within this thesis, in order for it to be effectively countered.  
 
The General Assembly has been particularly important in this development, remaining 
quietly engaged negotiating this United Nations counter terrorism policy over the past 40 
years. The recent Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and Universal Legal Framework 
against Terrorism are a product of its success and represent the most current and 
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comprehensive strategies on terrorism to exist internationally. Their creation has ensured 
that the United Nations role in terrorism prevention continues to be developed.  
 
These initiatives have been supported by a number of expert bodies that ensure compliance 
and proper implementation. They include the Financing Action Task Force, the Counter 
Terrorism Executive Directorate, the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force and 
the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. This 
Branch alone since 2003 has trained over 17,200 national criminal justice officials on the 
implementation of this counter terrorism policy.241 
This technical assistance has result in over 618 new ratifications of Universal Framework 
Conventions and more than 101 new pieces of counterterrorism legislation being 
developed domestically.242  
This if anything should demonstrate the level of international acceptance the counter 
terrorism policy attracts, despite there being no Comprehensive Convention against 
International Terrorism.  
 
The lack of a definition of terrorism within this framework is however a dent to the 
policy’s overall legitimacy. The purpose of this thesis has been to provide a pragmatic, 
solution-focused approach to resolving this issue. 
 
It has proposed that a successfully drafted international definition of terrorism does exist, 
found within one of the instruments that form the backbone of this United Nations counter 
terrorism framework. That is the definition of terrorism within Article 2(1) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999. 
This Convention’s negotiation process alone demonstrates that innovative Conventions can 
be developed within the space of a year. It holds the highest ratification rate of the 
Framework with 185 parties; therefore being only eight State parties away from universal 
acceptance. This is remarkable considering that it is one of the only international 
conventions in existence that contains a controversial definition of an act of terrorism.  
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This definition provides a compromise between groups of States with different outlooks on 
counter terrorism. It allows for recognition of the sectoral approach to counter terrorism by 
including an Annex. This clearly outlines the specific offences that States are able to deem 
as having terrorist intent, by making reference to the previous counter terrorism 
Conventions. States when needed can then develop this Annex further.  
The definition also however includes a ‘mini-definition’ of terrorism. This provides States 
with the elements of a terrorist offence including motives and acts, therefore compensating 
for the Annex’s failings. This takes into consideration the views of States who prefer a 
more all-encompassing approach, giving them clear guidance on the elements of an 
international definition of terrorism.  
 
This definition also makes important reference to a number of the obstacles raised within 
the Comprehensive Convention negotiations. It recognizes and provides a solution for the 
formulation of an armed forces caveat. It additionally, as a whole, supports the Right to 
Self-Determination by recognizing the large part that this right has within United Nations 
history. It also does not limit State sovereignty, leaving such contentious issues up to 
domestic authorities to deal with through reservations or during implementation of the 
definition.  
 
The comparison with the European regional definition of terrorism sought to both praise 
and critique this proposed definition. This demonstrated, through the instrument’s 
similarities, that the Financing Conventions definition has the necessary elements that 
would allow it to be applied to a wider context. It is able to effectively balance 
controversial issues and cover both the subjective and objective elements of the offence.  
 
The context in which this definition was developed is however considerably narrower than 
the context that this thesis seeks to apply it. The high ratification rate is a result primarily 
of September 11th and the shock that the attacks provoked across the world. States were 
legally required to ratify the Convention following Resolution 1373 and so the overall 
motives of States are unclear. Therefore the high level of international agreement should 
not be considered as full international support for the all the Convention’s provisions, 
including this definition.  
Despite this, the negotiation process success still represents international agreement on a 
controversial topic. The definition is able to provide a clear example to States of what 
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elements are necessary for acts of international terrorism. The use of such a definition as a 
guide for States, will add much needed legitimacy to technical assistance programs, 
ensuring that the implementation of the Universal Framework is somewhat uniform and 
that clarity is given to a number of its provisions. It may also in the future, with increased 
international recognition, be able to form a part of customary international law.  
 
The negotiations within the Ad Hoc Committee have been described as a quest for a 
common understanding of terrorism.243 This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that such 
an understanding already exists, through the international acceptance of this Framework, 
strategy and the definition that it includes. The creation of a Comprehensive Convention, 
this thesis contends, should now simply serve to complement this existing Framework, 
with any agreement being more politically rather than legally significant.   
 
This pragmatic approach to the definition problem has the potential to aid the further 
development of the provisions within this United Nations counter terrorism policy, 
allowing it to continue to provide a sustainable successful response to the problem of 
international terrorism. 
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